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The Committee for Economic Develop-
ment is an independent research and policy
organization of some 250 business leaders
and educators. CED is nonprofit, nonparti-
san, and nonpolitical. Its purpose is to pro-
pose policies that bring about steady eco-
nomic growth at high employment and
reasonably stable prices, increased productiv-
ity and living standards, greater and more
equal opportunity for every citizen, and an
improved quality of life for all.
All CED policy recommendations must
have the approval of trustees on the Research
and Policy Committee. This committee is di-
rected under the bylaws, which emphasize
that “all research is to be thoroughly objec-
tive in character, and the approach in each
instance is to be from the standpoint of the
general welfare and not from that of any
special political or economic group.” The
committee is aided by a Research Advisory
Board of leading social scientists and by a
small permanent professional staff.
The Research and Policy Committee does
not attempt to pass judgment on any pend-
ing specific legislative proposals; its purpose is
to urge careful consideration of the objectives
set forth in this statement and of the best means
of accomplishing those objectives.
Each statement is preceded by extensive
discussions, meetings, and exchange of memo-
randa. The research is undertaken by a sub-
committee, assisted by advisors chosen for their
competence in the field under study.
The full Research and Policy Committee
participates in the drafting of recommenda-
tions. Likewise, the trustees on the drafting
subcommittee vote to approve or disapprove a
policy statement, and they share with the
Research and Policy Committee the privilege
of submitting individual comments for publi-
cation.
The recommendations presented herein are
those of the trustee members of the Research and
Policy Committee and the responsible subcom-
mittee. They are not necessarily endorsed by other
trustees or by non-trustee subcommittee members,
advisors, contributors, staff members, or others
associated with CED.
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In the wake of the Asian, Russian, and
Brazilian financial crises in 1997–98, a wide
range of proposals were made to reconstruct
the “international financial architecture.” Some
called for radical change and wholesale rede-
sign of existing institutions. As business lead-
ers, we take a more pragmatic approach. In
this statement we recommend incremental
changes that rely heavily on the power of mar-
kets to improve the functioning of those insti-
tutions and the international financial system.
We firmly believe that the globalization of
financial markets holds the promise of higher
incomes and improved social standards world-
wide. We realize, however, that this promise
may go unfulfilled if the international finan-
cial system is unstable. The challenge for policy
makers is to put the system on a more stable
footing.
As this statement was being developed, two
new policy studies were released that addressed
similar issues—Safeguarding Prosperity in a Glo-
bal Financial System: The Future International
Financial  Architecture (by a task force of the
Council on Foreign Relations) and the
congressionally-mandated report of the Inter-
national Financial Institutions Advisory Com-
mission. Our policy statement shares many
common features with these reports. We agree
that recent financial crises have had multiple
causes and that many financial problems in
developing economies have been home grown.
However, our recommendations differ in im-
portant respects. We are concerned about the
potential reduction of capital available to de-
veloping countries from proposals to mandate
collective action clauses in bond contracts and
“bailing in” investors. We also believe that the
International Monetary Fund has played an
indispensable role in crisis prevention and res-
toration of stability when crises occur. Changes
at the IMF are clearly needed, but our recom-
mendations would build incrementally on the
IMF’s successes rather than radically revise its
mandate and procedures.
CED has issued many policy statements on
international economic issues, including most
recently U.S. Economic Policy Towards the Asia-
Pacific Region (1997). Since its active role in
creating the Bretton Woods institutions in the
1940s, CED has consistently supported open
markets and institutions and strategies that
recognize, facilitate, and manage growing in-
terdependence within a global economy. In
addition to this study of the international fi-
nancial system, CED expects to undertake an
analysis of America’s relationship to the inter-
national trading system. Together, these stud-
ies should help show the way to a more robust
global economy, reduced conflict, and higher
living standards worldwide.
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PURPOSE OF THIS STATEMENT
1CHAPTER 1
ADJUSTING TO THE NEW REALITIES
OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM:
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The international financial system normally
provides large economic benefits, but localized
breakdowns in that system—financial crises—
have occurred frequently over the past two de-
cades. Although officials in affected countries
and international financial institutions have
responded reasonably well to recent crises, the
costs of those crises have been significant. The
direct costs of unemployment, poverty, and
bankruptcies experienced in the crisis coun-
tries are obvious. The slowdown in growth of
output and income in other countries, although
less obvious, also has been costly. Even greater
costs will be incurred if international trade and
investment, which have underpinned advances
in global prosperity, are curtailed because of a
continual threat of disruption of financial mar-
kets and losses by investors.
Since the Mexican crisis of 1994/95, public
and private observers have been learning from
these crises and proposing reforms of the in-
ternational financial system. While we agree
that reform is needed, we believe the system is
fundamentally sound. Despite initial fears
prompted by the financial crises that rolled
through Asia, Russia, and Brazil, the global
financial system did not suffer catastrophic fail-
ure, and most crisis countries have recovered.
The relatively fast recovery and mildness of
spillover to other countries as a result of the
Asian crisis has placed the burden of proof on
those who would radically restructure the in-
ternational financial system. Rather than rede-
signing the international financial architecture,
reformers should be focusing on how individual
countries can improve and upgrade their do-
mestic institutions and policies to foster sus-
tained economic growth.
Proposed reforms would have serious impli-
cations for world and regional economic growth
and for the prospects of internationally ori-
ented businesses. To date, however, debate re-
garding these reforms has had limited input
from the business community, despite the dra-
matic impact that these crises have had on
business around the world. U.S.-based busi-
nesses invest, lend, and trade at substantial
levels with the developing countries most in-
volved in recent crises. In 1998, the stock of
U.S. foreign direct investments (FDI) in devel-
oping countries was valued at approximately
$300 billion, and the net annual FDI outflow
from the U.S. to developing countries was about
$27 billion.1 U.S. bank lending to these nations
amounted to about $95 billion,2 while U.S. ex-
ports to and imports from them were $306
billion and $421 billion respectively.3
ADAPTING TO THE NEW REALITIES
OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
Paradoxically, the problems of the past few
years are a result of the very successes of the
post-World War II global economic structure
1. Survey of Current Business, November 1999, Table G-2.
2. Bank of International Settlements, Consolidated International
Banking Statistics, November 1999, Table 2.
3. Trade figures are for 1997. IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics
Yearbook, 1998, p. 456.
2and transformative changes in information
technologies. Extensive global economic inte-
gration and high-speed transmission of infor-
mation, economic decisions, and money are
major features of today’s financial system.  The
size and structure of the global economy and,
in particular, the role of financial capital have
changed significantly in the 50 years since the
establishment of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. One central
feature has been the emergence of new capital
markets, especially in Latin America and Asia,
where many developing countries have experi-
enced substantial and sustained improvements
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in real per capita income. Those improvements
have come, in part, because of the trade and
investment linkages those countries formed
with more developed economies. As a result of
policy reforms undertaken by emerging mar-
ket countries that have made them more at-
tractive to foreign investors, private capital flows
to those countries now vastly outweigh official
capital transfers. An important feature of the
new economic landscape is the enormous vol-
ume of transactions in financial assets, which
now may be more important than trade to a
nation’s economic growth and stability.
After examining recent financial crises, we
conclude that the international financial sys-
tem suffers because institutions and policies
have not adjusted sufficiently to changes in
markets and technologies that have altered the
economic landscape. In particular, the devel-
opment of the institutional and social infra-
structure in many developing countries
significantly lags the development of commer-
cial and financial business. Our major findings
are:
• In general, the international financial sys-
tem works well and generates widespread
benefits. It enhances global economic
growth and efficiency by performing essen-
tially the same functions as domestic finan-
cial institutions. It facilitates trade in goods
and services and links the supply of savings
to the demand for capital. It provides a
stable source of foreign capital to develop-
ing countries and a vehicle for transfer of
technology and managerial know-how via
foreign direct investment.
• These benefits of the international finan-
cial system, however, have been accompa-
nied by significant economic costs resulting
from periodic crises. The stability and reli-
ability of the system can be improved by
strengthening its basic foundation. This
foundation rests on a market-based interna-
tional economic system, domestic political
and economic institutions that promote mar-
ket efficiency, integrity, and economic
growth, and international financial institu-
tions, such as the IMF, World Bank, and
Bank for International Settlements.
• It is essential that governments, private-sec-
tor businesses, and international financial
institutions learn from recent experiences
and make the adaptations necessary to avoid
or minimize the costs of future financial
crises. However, the wholesale redesign of
what has been termed “the international
financial architecture” would be a mistake.
Reforms should build upon and enhance
the existing architecture, rather than raze it
and create new structures.
• Problems in crisis countries for the most
part have been home grown. Countries with
inadequate economic, social, and legal in-
frastructures and poor government policies
are susceptible to financial crises and capi-
tal flight. Sound government institutions
and policies that support social and eco-
nomic goals are necessary to any well-func-
tioning market economy.
• No matter how good preventive efforts are,
financial crises are likely to occur. When
FINDINGS
34. Lawrence Summers, “The Right Kind of IMF for a Stable
Global Financial System” Remarks at the London Business School,
London, England, December 14, 1999.
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they do, a strong international backstop—
namely, the International Monetary Fund—
is needed to restore confidence and stabi-
lize the system. A strong IMF is indispens-
able to the continued stability and vitality of
the international financial system. We
should commend the IMF and work to im-
prove it, rather than condemn it.
• The financial costs of stabilization lending
have grown substantially. Under current
policies and structures, the IMF will not
always have sufficient funds to cover the
demand for stabilization lending.
• Mandated private-sector bail-ins would dam-
age the longer-term goal of transferring capi-
tal to emerging markets. Market forces al-
ready impose significant costs on foreign
private investors and lenders who take ex-
cessive risks. If public officials establish rules
to impose additional costs, they will pro-
long and deepen those crises that do occur
because private-sector capital will be with-
drawn just when it is most needed—as crisis
approaches.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
Our recommendations outline the steps that
should be taken by developing and developed
country governments, business and political
leaders in the United States, and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. These recommendations
are founded on our conviction that the system
can best be improved by continuous incremen-
tal reforms that build on market principles. We
note that, as this project neared completion,
the U.S. Administration put forward a set of
proposals that are very similar to our recom-
mendations.4 We commend the Administra-
tion for taking the lead in promoting
appropriate reforms and urge it to pursue those
reforms vigorously.
Developing Country Governments
Developing countries should increase
efforts to improve the fundamental institutions
and policies that support market-based econo-
mies open to international investment. Such
efforts should seek to develop or maintain gov-
ernment institutions that root out corruption,
provide an independent and honest judicial
system, and enforce the collection of taxes;
follow sound macroeconomic policies; protect
property rights; rely on markets; adopt even-
handed and transparent regulation where nec-
essary to correct well-identified market failures;
and provide open and transparent access to
information.
CED encourages developing countries to
adopt and apply international codes of con-
duct based on established and transparent stan-
dards and best practices to help build and
improve their economic and political institu-
tions. We support on-going efforts to codify
such standards and the greater use of private-
sector resources, including for-profit enter-
prises, volunteers, and paid technical experts,
to help developing countries raise their stan-
dards of practice. Countries that adopt inter-
national standards of best practice and improve
domestic policies will attract the foreign pri-
vate capital necessary for long-term economic
growth.  We recommend that the following
actions be taken by governments in the specific
areas of accounting standards, banking regula-
tion, bankruptcy procedures, corporate gover-
nance, and social policy.
• They should increase the transparency and
accountability of both government and pri-
vate institutions.
• They should strengthen bank supervision
and remove impediments to the operation
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of foreign banks in competition with do-
mestic institutions. Governments should re-
frain from providing explicit or implicit
guarantees of private investments and from
using the banking system to guide invest-
ments.
• They should establish bankruptcy proce-
dures that are transparent and even-handed.
These procedures should allow the claims
of creditors to be discharged fairly and pro-
vide the basis for the reemployment of pro-
ductive assets and the continuation of vi-
able enterprises. Domestic and international
creditors of an insolvent or bankrupt insti-
tution should receive equal and fair treat-
ment in any workout or debt restructuring.
• They should establish clear and viable rules
to define the agency relationship between
managers and shareholders and protect the
rights of shareholders. The rights of minor-
ity shareholders of corporations that are
predominantly family-owned or part of a
larger cross-ownership group should be pro-
tected.
• They should establish more comprehensive
social safety nets to better protect and assist
vulnerable groups in time of crisis or sig-
nificant economic transition.
In addition to those basic reforms, CED
recommends that developing country govern-
ments make greater use of market-based solu-
tions to resolve the difficult policy choices they
confront. Specifically:
• CED believes that floating exchange rates
are generally desirable for emerging mar-
ket economies that participate substantially
in international capital markets.
• Whatever exchange regimes countries
choose, they should build sufficient inter-
national reserves to weather crises and
should seek to establish lines of credit with
private lenders that can be called upon in
case of emergency.
• Emerging market countries should
strengthen their domestic financial systems
and work toward the goal of open capital
markets. However, a temporary tax on short-
term capital inflows may help a country with
a weak financial system to avoid economic
damage associated with the volatility of short-
term capital while it is engaged in reform.
U.S. and other Developed Country
Governments
Since developed countries are the primary
sources of financial capital going to emerging
markets, governments in those countries should
remain committed to an open global financial
system and in particular to the global institu-
tions, such as the IMF, that support that sys-
tem. Developed country governments should:
• create standards that would provide better
public information about the financial con-
dition of highly leveraged financial institu-
tions;
• leave the decision of whether to use collec-
tive action clauses in international bond
contracts to market participants, rather than
mandating their inclusion;
• ensure adequate funding for the IMF and
support improvements in its policies and
operations.
Developed country governments should also
recognize that the world’s heavily indebted
poorest countries (as defined by the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative) lack both
the resources and incentive to adopt better
policies while burdened by debt that they can-
not repay. CED urges developed country gov-
ernments to grant relief from official debt and
provide other forms of financial and technical
assistance for very poor countries that are try-
ing to establish a foundation for economic
growth through improved domestic policies.
Business Leaders in the United States
The primary task for business leaders in the
United States is to support the government’s
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commitment to an open global financial sys-
tem and encourage reforms that will make the
system stronger and more stable.
Specifically, business leaders should:
• support the efforts of developing countries
that are making necessary economic and
social improvements, through direct invest-
ments, loans and other lines of credit, and
technical assistance for raising standards of
practice;
• support the IMF and other institutions of
the international financial system;
• resist radical change of the system, such as
elimination of the IMF or creation of new
global economic regulators, since these radi-
cal proposals are either risky or unwork-
able;
• foster the understanding that businesses can-
not and should not rely on local govern-
ment or IMF bailouts to insure against losses
on investments or loans.
International Financial Institutions
The international financial institutions face
many challenges. Our recommendations focus
on the IMF because of the important roles it
plays in helping countries to prevent crises and
in providing or restoring stability when there
are financial crises.
• The IMF should continue to learn from
recent experience and adapt to the new
realities of the international financial sys-
tem. The IMF is to be commended for re-
evaluating its own policies; however, it
should go further and faster than it has to
date.
• The IMF should continue to improve its
operating procedures by becoming more
transparent and accountable with regard to
its own decision-making and by providing
better and more frequent information to
the public.
• The IMF should go beyond its current policy
of encouraging member countries to release
publicly information developed in the
course of Article IV consultations, and re-
quire that such information be released
within 60 days after the consultations take
place. This policy change should be phased
in over a reasonable period, perhaps one to
two years.
• The IMF should take greater responsibility
for identifying, monitoring, and investigat-
ing how IMF funds are spent and for ensur-
ing that such funds are not siphoned off in
fraud and corruption.
• The IMF should cease support where fraud
and corruption in a nation that is receiving
financial support from the IMF impedes
the sound functioning of political, legal,
and judicial systems.
• The IMF should emphasize sound macro-
economic policies and improvement of
banking and financial systems in its lending
advice.
• The IMF should place more emphasis on
crisis prevention and less on stabilization
programs. It should maintain normal lend-
ing limits and a policy of “constructive am-
biguity” with regard to specific cases to di-
minish concerns about moral hazard. The
IMF should have adequate—though not
abundant—resources to promote both cri-
sis prevention and stabilization.
• The IMF should act as a neutral “crisis man-
ager” when the need arises—neither bail-
ing in nor bailing out foreign lenders.
6CHAPTER 2
LONG-TERM CHANGE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM
5. Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, (New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999).
International capital markets have expanded
rapidly in the past decade because of advances
in technology, reforms of economic and politi-
cal institutions in developing countries, and
growth in trade and income fostered by inter-
national institutions and multinational busi-
nesses. Transactions in financial assets now have
a substantial influence on a nation’s economic
growth and stability. The frequency and costli-
ness of financial crises and the tendency of
such crises to spread from one country to an-
other threaten to curtail growth and improve-
ments in incomes in poor countries.
CHANGE IN WORLD CAPITAL
MARKETS SINCE THE END OF
WORLD WAR II
Today’s economy is defined by globaliza-
tion—the integration of capital, technology,
information, and production across national
borders.5 Technological advances have been a
major source of this integration. They have
significantly lowered the costs of communica-
tion, transportation, and information process-
ing, which has made it possible for businesses
to diversify production, enter new markets, and
create new products and services for sale
throughout the world. Technology has also
revolutionized finance, making possible the
growth and diversity of financial instruments
that support the growth of the real economy.
Overall, the growth of mutual funds, hedge
funds, and derivatives, which allow for the un-
bundling and reconfiguration of risk, have
raised the supply and lowered the cost of capi-
tal.
Another major factor in globalization has
been the spread of free-market capitalism
throughout the developing countries, especially
since the fall of the Soviet Union. Although the
most successful emerging market economies
in Asia and Latin America have followed mar-
ket-based economic policies for a long time,
the spread of those policies and democratic
institutions accelerated in the 1990s. Many gov-
ernments reduced regulation and opened capi-
tal markets, which led to increased foreign
direct investment and other private capital in-
flows.
Post-war economic policies under the
Bretton Woods system also have played a major
role in the creation of today’s highly integrated
global economy.  Those policies fostered full
employment and economic growth through a
threefold strategy: first, to provide a stable eco-
nomic environment, initially through a system
of fixed exchange rates; second, to facilitate
the expansion of trade based on comparative
advantage; and third, to facilitate the transfer
of capital from countries with relatively abun-
dant capital to those short of capital but with
large investment opportunities, initially in Eu-
rope and later throughout the developing
world.
As restrictions on international trade and
finance have fallen and countries have com-
7mitted themselves to market-based economic
systems, global trade and investment have
grown dramatically. The volume of world trade
has risen steadily over the past 50 years, tying
the world economy closer together and gener-
ating growth in income and employment. The
rise in international investment was most dra-
matic between the mid 1980s and the onset of
the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The volume
of foreign direct investment worldwide rose
from a level of $76 billion in gross flows in 1985
to about $450 billion in 1997.6 Net foreign
direct investment to developing countries in-
creased from about $18 billion in 1990 to $138
billion in 1997. Net private capital flows of all
types to developing countries rose during the
same period from $31 billion to over $170
billion.7
The volume of transactions in foreign cur-
rency, now estimated to be about $1.5 trillion
each day, suggests the enormous scale of the
global financial system.8 That daily figure is
about one-fifth the annual value of world ex-
ports. Thus, a significant feature of today’s glo-
bal financial system is the apparent delinking
of financial transactions from the underlying
real economy. Where financial transactions
once primarily financed the purchase of goods,
services (such as travel), and investment in
physical assets, they now often are far removed
from those real activities; as little as five per-
cent of daily currency transactions may be
linked to trade in goods and services.9
Globalization has had a profound impact
on the U.S. economy. U.S. participation in
world capital markets—calculated as the sum
of U.S. bonds and equities sold to foreigners
and purchased from foreigners by Americans—
equaled 4 percent of U.S. GDP in 1975 and 213
percent in 1997.10 Total cross-border sales and
purchases of U.S. Treasury bonds rose from
$30 billion to $500 billion between 1983 and
1993.11 In trade, the sum of U.S. exports and
imports rose from the equivalent of 17 percent
of GDP in 1985 to 25 percent of GDP in 1997.12
This international investment and trade has
raised incomes in the United States and con-
tributed to the creation of today’s high pro-
ductivity, low inflation economy.
The Importance of Capital Formation
and Strong Institutions for Economic
Development
Although many different factors play a role
in economic development, a key component is
capital formation, in part because capital in-
vestment embodies newer technologies. Invest-
ment is necessary for economic growth;
countries that have grown most rapidly over
long periods have devoted a high percentage
of GDP to investment in physical and human
capital. Studies of growth in East Asia in par-
ticular highlight the overwhelming importance
of physical investment in that region.13 As shown
in Table 1, page 8, both domestic savings and
investment have been remarkably high in the
East Asia and Pacific region.
A high level of capital formation, however,
is not enough.  Investments can be wasted on
unproductive projects or concentrated in
projects with few linkages to the overall
economy. Many different elements must come
together for growth to be sustained and trans-
formative. The most successful developing
countries have growth-oriented, market-based
policies that are open to foreign investment.
Macroeconomic stability has also been impor-
tant for sustaining long-term growth and, in
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6. International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Capital Mar-
kets, September 1998, p. 187.
7. IMF, International Capital Markets, September 1998, p. 13.
8. Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President,
1999, p. 224.
9. Barry M. Hager, Limiting Risks and Sharing Losses in the Global-
ized Capital Market, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center
Press, 1998), p. 6.
10. Bank of International Settlements, Annual Report, 1998.
11. John Eatwell, International Financial Liberalization: The Impact
on World Development, UNDP Office of Development Studies,
Discussion Paper #12, p. 4.
12. Economic Report of the President, 1999, Table B-1.
13. Dani Rodrik, The New Global Economy and Developing Countries:
Making Openness Work, Policy Essay no. 24 (Overseas Develop-
ment Council, 1999) pp. 15-16.
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particular, for adjusting to changing circum-
stances and external shocks.14 Such adjustment
is enhanced by markets that transmit economic
information quickly and accurately and by ef-
fective social infrastructure—such as political
participation, civil and political liberties, labor
unions, non-corrupt bureaucracies, indepen-
dent judiciaries, and social insurance pro-
grams—that allow competing interests to
mediate their conflicts.
Even with high rates of domestic saving,
many developing countries still need to import
capital because they have more productive in-
vestment opportunities than they can finance.
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Saving and Investment Rates
by Developing Country Region
TABLE 1
Gross               Gross
Domestic            Domestic
Investment          Saving
(percent of GDP) (percent of GDP)
1980 1997 1980 1997
Low Income 20 22 15 17
Middle Income 27 26 27 26
High Income 25 21 24 22
World 25 22 24 23
East Asia and
Pacific 32 36 33 38
Latin Am. and
Caribbean 24 22 22 20
Middle East and
N. Africa 27 24 38 25
South Asia 21 23 15 18
Sub Saharan
Africa 24 18 26 17
Definitions of country groups: Low-income, GNP per capita
below $785 in 1997; Middle-income, GNP per capita between
$785 and $9,656; High-income, GNP per capita above $9,656.
SOURCE: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1999,
Table 4.9
14. Rodrik, The New Global Economy and Developing Countries:
Making Openness Work, p. 99.
Some countries lack institutions that efficiently
mobilize savings and channel resources to
projects with high rates of return. Until re-
cently, developing countries as a group were
dependent on official sources for external capi-
tal. Figure 1 shows the trend of net private and
official capital flows to developing countries
from 1971 to 1998. Between 1971 and 1989,
official and private capital flows each rose from
near 0.5 percent of the aggregate GDP of de-
veloping countries to about 1 percent. Private
flows fluctuated sharply during the period, fall-
ing three times to near zero and rising once to
over 1.5 percent of GDP. Those patterns
changed after many of the economically ad-
vanced developing countries began to open
Percent of GDP
Figure 1
Developing Countries: Private and
Official Flows, 1971–1998
SOURCE: Michael Mussa, Alexander Swoboda, Jeromin
Zettelmeyer, and Olivier Jeanne, “Moderating Fluctuations in
Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies,” prepared for
the Conference on Key Issues in Reform of the International Monetary
and Financial System, IMF, May 28–29, 1999.
1971    1974     1977     1980     1983     1986    1989     1992    1995     1998
Private Flows
Official Flows
9their capital markets in the early 1990s. Be-
tween 1991 and 1996, private capital flows were
generally between 3.0 and 3.5 percent of the
developing countries’ aggregate GDP, while
official flows trended toward zero. In 1997 and
1998, private flows fell and official flows rose
because of the Asian financial crisis.
Private capital flows take many different
forms. Foreign direct investment (FDI) ac-
counted for about one-half of net private capi-
tal flows to emerging markets between 1992
and 1997.15 FDI usually refers to investment
carried out by foreign private companies that
play an active role in the management of a
domestic enterprise.16 It reflects the investor’s
goal to obtain a lasting interest in an enter-
prise that resides in another country and im-
plies a long-term relationship between the
investor and the enterprise.17 In addition to
the direct transfer of capital, economic
spillovers from FDI, such as transfers of mana-
gerial and technological expertise, provide sig-
nificant benefits to the host country. FDI brings
both incomes and jobs to a country and adds to
the government’s tax base, which allows for
more expenditure on social programs such as
education, health, and sanitation.
Foreign direct investment fluctuates less
than other forms of capital transfer. As shown
in Table 2, during the recent financial crisis in
Asia, FDI (direct equity, net) remained high
for the five crisis countries and is even esti-
mated to have increased into the recovery.
Portfolio investment, which includes equity
securities, debt securities in the form of bonds,
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16. The investor only has to be able to influence or participate in
the management of an enterprise. FDI is defined as ownership
by a single foreign investor of 10 percent or more of the voting
securities of a business enterprise. Absolute control is not re-
quired as under former definitions. We are using the working
definition of FDI used by the OECD and the IMF, with the U.S.
using the same definition (qualifications vary from country to
country). See Robert E. Lipsey, “The Role of Foreign Direct
Investment in International Capital Flows,” NBER Working
Paper #7094, p. 6.
17. IMF, Balance of Payments Manual, 5th ed, (Washington, DC:
IMF, 1993).
      Asia 5*: Capital Flows ($ billions)
                                1995    1996    1997    1998e 1999f
External Capital
Flows, net 83.1 99.0 28.6 -4.2 7.8
Private Flows, net 80.4 102.3 0.3 -27.6 0.2
Equity
Investing, net 15.2 18.6 4.4 13.8 18.5
   Direct Equity,
   net 4.2 4.7 5.9 9.5 12.5
   Portfolio
   Equity, net 11.0 13.9 -1.5 4.3 6.0
Private
Creditors, net 65.2 83.7 -4.1 -41.4 -18.3
   Commercial
   Banks, net 53.2 62.7 -21.2 -36.1 -16.0
   Nonbanks, net 12.0 21.0 17.1 -5.3 -2.3
Official Flows, net 2.7 -3.3 28.3 23.4 7.6
   Int’l Financial
   Institutions -0.3 -2.0 22.6 19.3 -1.7
   Bilateral
   Creditors 3.0 -1.3 5.7 4.1 9.3
* Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and
South Korea
NOTE: e = estimated, f = forecasted.
SOURCE: Institute for International Finance “Capital Flows to
Emerging Markets”, April 1999.
TABLE 2
money market instruments, and financial de-
rivatives, generally accounts for a smaller por-
tion of all capital flows. However, this type of
investment grew substantially in Asia before
the crisis. Whereas the classification of invest-
ments used to depend in part on the stated
maturity of the investment— long-term invest-
ment having a stated maturity of more than
one year—changes in financial markets have
rendered that formal distinction of little im-
portance. In today’s markets, the original ma-
turity of a security is much less important than
its liquidity.  FDI tends to be illiquid, whereas
portfolio investments may be more easily con-
verted to cash. Thus the net flows to Asia of less
stable and more liquid portfolio equity turned
from positive to negative in 1997.
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Other highly liquid investments include:
trade credit, loans from commercial and non-
bank private creditors, financial leases, cur-
rency, and bank deposits. As seen in Table 2,
those types of investments also can be easily
reversed. The turnaround in private credit
(bank and nonbank loans) between 1996 and
1998 was about $125 billion.
Economic and Social Growth in
Developing Countries
The transfer of capital to developing coun-
tries has boosted their economic growth and
enabled improvement in social conditions, in-
cluding health, literacy, and sanitation. As
shown in Table 3, per capita economic growth
in the last third of the 20th century has been
positive for nearly all country groupings. De-
spite occasional downturns in economic activ-
ity, developing countries as a group have
recorded impressive gains in per capita in-
come over a long period. Growth in output
and income has been particularly striking in
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the East Asia and Pacific region. Only Sub-
Saharan Africa has had a decline in per capita
income over the period, as rapid population
growth has outstripped relatively slow growth
in GNP.
Higher economic growth means greater re-
sources and opportunity.  As income rises, ex-
penditures on health, education, and sanitation
also rise. Social indicators have improved in all
regions since the 1970s, but to varying degrees.
Table 3 highlights selected health and educa-
tion indicators in developing country regions
for the last two to three decades. Infant mortal-
ity, life expectancy at birth, secondary school
enrollment, and youth illiteracy all show sig-
nificant improvement.
Economic growth in developing countries
not only benefits them directly, but provides
benefits to the larger global economy. When
incomes rise, imports from countries such as
the United States tend to rise also. In addition,
countries with rising incomes may have a greater
interest in achieving agreements on global
1per 1000 live births
2 percent of relevant age groups
SOURCE: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1999, various tables.
Selected Economic, Health and Education Indicators, By Region
TABLE 3
Real GNP Infant Life Secondary Youth
Growth Mortality Expectancy School Illiteracy
1965-1997 Rate1 at Birth Enrollment2 Rate (female)
(annual average) 1970 1997 1970 1997 1980 1996 1980 1997
Sub-Saharan
Africa -0.2 137 91 48 51 15 27 55 29
Latin America
and Caribbean 1.3   84 32 65 70 42 52 11   6
Middle East and
N. Africa 0.1 134 49 53 67 42 64 52 27
East Asia and
Pacific 5.4   79 37 65 69 43 69 15   4
South Asia 2.3 139 77 54 62 27 48 64 48
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goals, such as improvement in environmental
conditions, respect for human rights, and non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons. The valida-
tion of the value of democratic institutions is
one of the notable benefits of economic devel-
opment in the latter part of the twentieth cen-
tury.
MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF
RECENT FINANCIAL CRISES
In the 1990s, many developing countries
removed restrictions on both the import and
export of capital. While the goal was sound, in
many cases the implementation created prob-
lems because domestic institutions, especially
banks and their regulators, were unprepared
for the new conditions. Thus, well-meaning
reforms created new instabilities and ultimately
paved the path for financial crises.  The chal-
lenge for policy makers now is to secure the
benefits of freer financial markets while reduc-
ing the instabilities that such freedom can cre-
ate.
Periodic financial crises have been a fea-
ture of capitalism since its inception. How-
ever, starting with the Mexican peso crisis that
began in December 1994 and stretching
through the crises that rolled through East
Asia, Russia, and Brazil, we appear to have
entered a new era. Crises now are more likely
to be driven by sudden capital account out-
flows triggered by a change in investor expec-
tations than by poor economic fundamentals.18
In the past, crises tended to be caused by in-
consistent policies in an overheated economy.
For example, a country might have tried to
maintain a fixed exchange rate while it ran
persistently large fiscal deficits and expanded
the money supply. Over time, that combina-
tion of policies would have eroded the country’s
international reserves and its ability to defend
a pegged exchange rate. At that point, the
government would have had to either devalue
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the currency or raise interest rates to contract
the economy.
Today’s financial crises are more often
caused by self-fulfilling expectations about cur-
rency devaluations. Now, it takes only a change
in expectations by currency traders about the
government’s commitment to the maintenance
of a fixed exchange rate to produce a sharp
and sudden reversal in capital flows, even if the
economy appears to have sound economic fun-
damentals. A sudden shift in market expecta-
tions about a country’s commitment to a pegged
exchange rate can easily and quickly trigger a
speculative attack that makes the pegged ex-
change rate impossible or too costly to main-
tain.
The increased scale of capital flows is sig-
nificant for a number of reasons. First, it has
increased an economy’s vulnerability to sud-
den capital outflows. The more dependent an
economy is on the inflow of external capital,
the more vulnerable it is to a sudden shift in
that flow. Second, it has increased the scale of
resources needed to stabilize an economy in
financial crisis. Third, due to the greater in-
volvement of foreign private-sector lenders and
investors, the financial relationships that need
to be untangled in the event of a default have
become more complex. Both the increase in
the scale and the complexity of outside link-
ages heighten concern about the contagious
spread of a financial meltdown from one coun-
try to others and the potential for greater sys-
tem risk.  As put by one economist:
“Financial crises once made most
people’s eyes glaze over; they were sub-
jects of intense interest only to a limited
clientele many of whom wore green
eyeshades. Not any longer. The topic
has unfortunately acquired a mass audi-
ence in the second half of the 1990s.
Stunning currency collapses in Mexico
(1995), southeast Asia (1997), Russia
(1998), and Brazil (1999) have pushed
the subject to the front page. Financial
conflagrations have become too fre-18. IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 1999, p. 68.
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quent, too devastating, and too conta-
gious to be ignored.”19
Frequency
Analysis by the IMF shows that, while finan-
cial crises have occurred frequently during the
1990s, they are no more frequent than during
previous decades.20 Looking at the period 1975
to 1997, it found 158 episodes in which coun-
tries experienced currency crises and 55 epi-
sodes of banking crises. A currency crisis was
defined as a devaluation (or sharp deprecia-
tion) of a currency, or a sharp rise in the inter-
est rate or decline in international reserves in
response to a speculative attack on the exchange
value. A banking crisis was defined as a situa-
tion where actual or potential depositor runs
compelled banks to suspend payment on their
liabilities (deposits) or where the government
intervened to prevent that from happening.21
The number of currency crises was particularly
high in the mid-1970s and mid-1980s due first
to oil price shocks and then to the Latin Ameri-
can debt crises. Banking crises were more preva-
lent after the early 1980s. The IMF study also
found that the incidence of crisis was twice as
great for emerging market countries as for
developed countries.
Cost
The IMF’s analysis, however, also shows that
crises have become more costly.22 A useful mea-
sure of the cost of a financial crisis is the esti-
mated loss in output (GDP) compared with its
trend growth. As shown in Table 4, on average,
countries experiencing a currency crisis had a
cumulative loss in output relative to trend of
4.3 percent and a recovery time of about 1.6
years. For countries experiencing a combined
currency and banking crisis, output loss was
14.4 percent, on average, and recovery time
stretched to 3.2 years. In its analysis of the costs
of the Asian crisis, the IMF calculated the cu-
mulative output losses for Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, and Thailand to range between 27
and 82 percent (see Table 5, page 14). These
losses tended to be much higher than those of
Mexico and Argentina during the so-called
tequila crisis of 1994/95.
The heavy costs of crises are also reflected
in other socio-economic data. For example,
the unemployment rate increased by three to
five times its pre-crisis levels in Asia, rising from
about 3 percent to over 15 percent in Indone-
sia, 2 percent to 8 percent in Thailand, and 2
percent to 7 percent in Korea.23 Real wages fell
25 to 35 percent in Indonesia and 10 percent
in Korea.24 The World Bank estimates that more
than 20 million people in East Asia fell into
poverty as a result of the crisis.25 Expenditures
on social safety net measures are estimated to
have doubled in Thailand and Indonesia, lead-
ing to deterioration in the fiscal balance of
about 1 percent of GDP. Bank restructuring is
estimated to add to the fiscal burden by an-
other 1 to 3 percent, depending on the indi-
vidual country.26
Contagion
Perhaps the most worrisome aspect of re-
cent crises is the increase in contagion—the
spread of crisis from one country to another.
Contagion is indicated if crises are concen-
trated in time or concentrated geographically.
If contagion were not a factor, one would ex-
pect to see crises distributed relatively evenly in
time and location.  However, research by the
19. Alan Blinder, “Eight Steps to a New Financial Order,” Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 5, p. 50.
20. IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 1998, pp. 76-79.
21.  The IMF also included in the definition of a currency crisis
situations when a country was forced to defend its currency by
expending a large volume of international reserves or sharply
raise interest rates to defend its currency instead of devaluing it.
IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 1998.
22. IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 1998, pp. 78-79.
23. ILO data; cited in World Bank, Global Economic Prospects,
1999, p. 105.
24. Joseph Stiglitz, “Back to Basics: Policies and Strategies for
Enhanced Growth and Equity in Post-Crisis East Asia,” Speech,
Bangkok, Thailand, July 29, 1999.
25. James Wolfensohn, “The Other Crisis," Address to the Board
of Governors of the IMF and World Bank, October 6, 1998.
26. IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 1999, pp. 79-80.
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Cumulative Cumulative
Loss Loss of Output
Average of Output  Crisis with  per Crisis with
Recovery per Crisis2 Output Output Loss4
Number Time1 (in percentage Losses3 (in percentage
of Crises (in years) points) (in percent) points)
Currency crises 158 1.6 4.3 61 7.1
Industrial   42 1.9 3.1 55 5.6
Emerging market 116 1.5 4.8 64 7.6
Currency crashes5   55 2.0 7.1 71 10.1
Industrial   13 2.1 5.0 62 8.0
Emerging Market   42 1.9 7.9 74 10.7
Banking crises   54 3.1 11.6 82 14.2
Industrial   12 4.1 10.2 67 15.2
Emerging Market   42 2.8 12.1 86 14.0
Currency and Banking crises6   32 3.2 14.4  78 18.5
Industrial     6 5.8 17.6 100 17.6
Emerging Market   26 2.6 13.6  73 18.8
1Average amount of time until GDP growth returned to trend.  Because GDP growth data are available for all countries only on an
annual basis, by construction the minimum recovery time was one year.
2Calculated by summing the differences between trend growth and output growth after the crisis began until the time when annual
output growth returned to its trend and by averaging over all crises.
3Percent of crises in which output was lower than trend after the crisis began.
4Calculated by summing the differences between trend growth and output growth after the crisis began until the time when annual
output growth returned to its trend and by averaging over all crises that had output losses.
5Currency "crashes" are identified by crises where the currency component of the exchange market pressure index accounts for 75
percent or more of the index when the index signals a crisis.
6Identified when a banking crisis occurred within a year of a currency crisis.
SOURCE:  Replicated from IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 1998, p. 79.
Costs of Crises in Lost Output Relative to Trend
TABLE 4
IMF shows that during the 1990s, crises were
clustered in time around four major periods.27
In addition, crises tended to affect neighbor-
ing countries more than distant ones. The
breakdown of the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) primarily affected European
industrial countries and emerging markets in
the Middle East and Africa; the Mexican crisis
was felt mostly in Latin America; the Asian
crisis spilled over mostly to other Asian coun-
tries; and the Russian crisis affected eastern
European countries and some countries out-
27. IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 1999. The analysis is of
currency crises; it is based on the construction of an index of
changes in exchange rates and foreign exchange reserves. The
ERM crisis occurred during September 1992 through February
1993; the Mexican crisis, December 1994 through May 1995; the
Asian crisis, July through December 1997; and the Russian crisis,
August through November 1998.
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side the region, notably Brazil and other coun-
tries in Latin America.
 Several factors account for such contagion.
Herd behavior by investors is an explanation
that has often been cited. Such behavior has
been attributed in part to the increased inte-
gration of international financial markets,
which can weaken the incentives for individu-
als to gather information independently and
strengthen the tendency to follow market lead-
ers. Other factors that contribute to contagion
include “trade spillovers” resulting from a sud-
den change in price competitiveness and de-
cline in income that occurs when a crisis
country suddenly devalues its currency; “finan-
cial spillovers” that occur when investors de-
cide to sell financial assets in other countries,
either to raise cash to cover losses elsewhere or
simply to reduce exposure to risk; and shifts in
investor sentiment that result from a reassess-
ment of countries’ fundamentals in the wake
of a crisis elsewhere.
1Calculated as the sum of the output gap over a four-year
period, starting with the crisis year. The output gap is defined
as the percentage difference between the actual and the
hypothetical (or potential) level of real GDP for each country.
SOURCE: Replicated from IMF, World Economic Outlook,
October 1999.
Cumulative Output Losses of 1990s Crises
TABLE 5
(in percent of potential output)
Cumulative Four-Year
Output Loss1
“Tequila Crisis”
Argentina 15
Mexico 30
Asian Crisis
Indonesia 82
Korea 27
Malaysia 39
Thailand 57
Contagion does not have to induce a crisis
to be costly. Countries can experience a slow-
down of growth without slipping into reces-
sion, and the value of lost output (relative to
what might have been produced) should be
counted as a cost. The IMF has estimated the
decline in world economic growth after the
Asian crisis, taking into account both the di-
rect costs incurred by crisis countries and the
indirect costs of slower growth elsewhere caused
by trade and investment linkages. These esti-
mates show world economic growth lower by
1.8 percentage points in 1998, 1.0 percentage
point in 1999, and 0.5 percentage points in
2000. With world GDP estimated to be about
$39 trillion in 1998 (valued at purchasing power
parity), the decline in growth translates into a
cumulative economic loss of over $1.1 trillion
worldwide during these three years.
THE NEED FOR GREATER
STABILITY IN GLOBAL
FINANCIAL MARKETS
Overall, the globalization of financial mar-
kets holds the promise of higher income for
both capital exporting and capital importing
countries. However, that promise may not be
fulfilled unless greater stability can be achieved.
In addition to the economic losses discussed
above, economic instability creates at least two
additional and less obvious costs. The first is
economic; financial crises cause individuals to
become less certain about their future incomes
and consequently to reduce their living stan-
dards by saving more.28 The second is more
political—an erosion in support for open in-
ternational trade and investment. The chal-
lenge for policy makers is to lower these costs
by putting the international financial system
on a more stable footing.
From a political perspective, economic vola-
tility is likely eventually to diminish support for
28. IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 1999, p. 80.
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the system that produces it. Perhaps one of the
most remarkable features of the recent finan-
cial crises is that, for the most part, support for
market-based reforms and for international
trade and investment does not seem to have
diminished in most emerging market econo-
mies. These countries have in general main-
tained their support for foreign direct
investment and in some cases, such as banking,
even opened their doors further to foreign
participation. Nevertheless, it cannot be ex-
pected that support will continue if economic
conditions, which have improved significantly
in most of the crisis countries, begin to deterio-
rate again, or if such crises are repeated.
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CHAPTER 3
BUILDING INSTITUTIONS TO
WORLD-CLASS STANDARDS
Most emerging market countries have ample
room to improve their domestic institutions
and economic policies. Countries that want to
prosper must foster economic, regulatory, and
political institutions and practices that create
stability and integrity, while allowing markets
to allocate resources efficiently, adapt to chang-
ing conditions, and facilitate growth.
Governments often find it difficult to estab-
lish domestic policies and institutions that pro-
vide the right combination of marketplace
freedoms with the government oversight and
regulation necessary to overcome market fail-
ures. Finding the “right” combination is no
easy task. In fact, it defines many of the major
struggles between political parties in nearly
every market-based economy in the world. Cer-
tainly, no country—not even the United
States—can claim to have found the ideal bal-
ance between those competing goals. However,
the systems that have been developed in the
United States and other major mature econo-
mies have provided substantial stability and
integrity and the basis for sustained long-term
economic growth. Most emerging market na-
tions have not yet built institutions sufficiently
strong to foster growth and maintain stability
simultaneously. The difficulty of their task
should not be underestimated.
One place to start is to root out corruption
and bribery from the basic institutions of gov-
ernment. The experiences of many businesses
operating in developing countries are con-
firmed by surveys, such as those conducted by
Transparency International, which show ram-
pant corruption and bribery in many of the
leading emerging market countries.29 Little
progress will be made in improving govern-
ment institutions and practices until corrup-
tion and bribery are curbed.
Another important step is to adopt and ap-
ply international codes of conduct based on
established and transparent standards and best
practices. CED encourages developing coun-
tries to adopt and apply international codes of
conduct based on established and transparent
standards and best practices to help build and
improve their economic and political institu-
tions. The “best practice” approach is being
promoted by official bodies, such as the Group
of Seven (G-7) industrialized nations, and by
private-sector institutions, such as international
professional associations. We support on-going
efforts to codify such standards and the greater
use of private-sector resources, including for-
profit enterprises, volunteers, and paid techni-
cal experts, to help developing countries raise
their standards of practice.
This approach recognizes the right of each
nation to set its own laws while it employs mar-
ket forces to encourage compliance with inter-
national standards. Each sovereign nation, with
its own culture, traditions, values, and politics,
must forge policies that meet its unique cir-
cumstances. International institutions can ad-
29. Transparency International, “Press Release: New Poll Shows
Many Leading Exporters Using Bribes,” October 26, 1999, Ber-
lin, Germany.  Website at http://www.transparency.de/docu-
ments/cpi/cpi-bpi_press-release.html
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vise, assist and otherwise support those poli-
cies, but the responsibility for implementing
and maintaining them rests (and should rest)
with each nation. However, the incentive for a
country to comply with international standards
is clear. Countries that adopt and adhere to
these international standards will gain twice.
They gain first from the direct improvements
in economic efficiency that the application of
these practices will achieve, and second from
more and cheaper foreign private capital from
lenders more willing to supply funds to coun-
tries that adhere to recognized international
standards.
Discussions of codes of conduct and stan-
dards of practice have taken place in a variety
of settings, including the IMF, the Bank for
International Settlements, the International
Organization of Securities Commissions, the
International Association of Insurance Super-
visors, the International Accounting Standards
Committee, the International Federation of
Accountants, and elsewhere. In part, the goal
of such codes is to provide guidance to both
governments and businesses, signal their com-
pliance with recognized practices, and apply
market pressure to raise standards. The exist-
ence of standards of good practice sends im-
portant signals to both officials in the emerging
market countries and investors in the devel-
oped countries. Officials in the emerging mar-
kets learn what steps they must take to satisfy
international investors; investors learn whether
conditions in a particular country meet their
expectations.
Significantly, many standard-setting institu-
tions are private-sector organizations. Private-
sector groups that develop “best practices” in
their areas of expertise bring knowledge and
practical experience to the process. In addi-
tion, members of these groups with specific
expertise are uniquely positioned to help de-
veloping countries implement new practices
by working with business and professional coun-
terparts in those countries. By developing part-
nerships, facilitating information exchange, and
volunteering to train others, business leaders
and professionals in the U.S. and other indus-
trialized countries can help promote and trans-
fer best practices.
However, it is essential to get “best prac-
tices” right. Substantial criticism has been di-
rected at the 1998 Basle Capital Accord, which
set a standard for the adequacy of bank capital
reserves based on assigning risk weights to
classes of assets. Such a system can distort deci-
sion-making if meeting the regulatory targets
becomes the goal. The Basle capital standards
may have contributed to the East Asian crisis by
inappropriately assigning very low risk weights
to short-term interbank loans and loans to sov-
ereign entities, especially in the case of Korea.
(Korea earned a zero risk weighting after it
became a member of the OECD.) The Basle
Committee has now published a draft proposal
for new standards that would improve the
method by which bank supervisors evaluate
the risks of bank loans.30 Any standard setting
process should incorporate such continuous
improvement.
The development of international standards
and codes of practice is taking place in nearly
50 separate policy areas, including areas as
diverse as accounting, ethics, and tax collec-
tion. We highlight briefly below a few of the
major efforts underway to improve transpar-
ency and accountability, bankruptcy, financial
supervision, corporate governance, and social
policy.
TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
One of the most significant, and perhaps
easiest, steps that a country can take to im-
prove its economic climate is to increase the
transparency and accountability of both gov-
ernment and private institutions. Transparency
refers to a process by which timely information
30. Basle Committee on Bank Supervision, “A New Capital Ad-
equacy Framework” (Bank of International Settlements, June
1999).
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about existing conditions, decisions, and ac-
tions is made accessible, visible, and under-
standable. Reliable information is a necessary
ingredient for good decision-making and is
especially important to investors. Accountabil-
ity refers to the need to justify and accept re-
sponsibility for decisions taken.31 Increased
transparency and accountability will improve
resource allocation by providing more and bet-
ter information to all participants.
Public Sector. One of the key problems con-
tributing to past crises was the lack of good
information about such economic fundamen-
tals as the state of government finances, the
growth of credit, and the size of foreign cur-
rency reserves. In some instances, governments
apparently hid unfavorable information. In
other cases, governments themselves simply
lacked the basic information needed to make
sound policy decisions.
Several efforts are underway to help coun-
tries produce and disseminate information
about government monetary and fiscal condi-
tions. For the most part these activities are
being carried out by the IMF with national
authorities. IMF actions build on Article IV
consultations and their recently initiated pro-
grams for strengthening data dissemination,
the Special Data Dissemination Standard
(SDDS) and General Data Dissemination Sys-
tem (GDDS). Taken together, these programs
encourage countries to meet established guide-
lines for international reserves, external debt
and other economic indicators, to improve their
internal reporting on key economic variables,
and to make more information available to the
public on both their economic conditions and
IMF programs and recommendations for im-
provement.  Notably, the IMF is working on
both a code of “Good Practices on Fiscal Trans-
parency” and a code of “Good Practices on
Transparency in Monetary and Financial Poli-
cies.”
Private Sector. Significant gaps also exist in
reporting by private-sector entities, and espe-
cially by hedge funds, other highly leveraged
institutions, and non-bank financial institutions.
Much of the work in this area is appropriately
being undertaken by public and private-sector
bodies with existing responsibilities for setting
standards in such financial activities as account-
ing, banking, insurance, and securities. In
addition, the newly formed Financial Stability
Forum—a group charged with enhancing in-
ternational cooperation and coordination in
financial market supervision—is expected to
report on the difficult issues surrounding highly
leveraged institutions, offshore financial cen-
ters, and short-term capital flows.
Disclosure and transparency become more
difficult to enforce when transactions, such as
derivatives and swaps, are taken off balance
sheets and performed by financial institutions
that are not generally as regulated as banks.  In
today’s global financial market, no single type
of financial institution should be allowed pref-
erential treatment just because the task of se-
curing useful information is difficult. The
importance of off-balance sheet financial trans-
actions and other activities of highly leveraged
institutions and non-banks demands that both
public-sector and private-sector authorities,
such as the International Accounting Standards
Committee and the International Organization
of Securities Commissions, find some means
by which markets can become informed of
their activities. Such information is required by
both market participants and monetary authori-
ties to evaluate an institution’s financial viabil-
ity and its potential to threaten system stability.
The collapse of the Long-Term Capital Man-
agement hedge fund makes the case for such
reporting. The United States and other devel-
oped countries should act, either individually
or collectively, to create standards that would
provide better public information about the
financial condition of highly leveraged finan-
cial institutions.
31. G-22, “Report of the Working Group on Transparency and
Accountability,” October 1998.
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BANKING AND OTHER
FINANCIAL REGULATION
Bank supervision should be strengthened,
and governments should remove impediments
to the operation of foreign banks in competi-
tion with domestic institutions. Governments
should refrain from providing explicit or im-
plicit guarantees of private investments and
from using the banking system to guide invest-
ments.
Banks play a key role in maintaining—or
upending—financial balance. Bank lending is
important in allocating resources within the
economy, and when banks borrow abroad, they
are an important conduit of foreign funds into
the domestic economy. But banks are a poten-
tial weak point in the financial system because
the structure of their assets and liabilities leaves
them susceptible to a loss of confidence by
depositors. Banks’ liabilities (deposits) are typi-
cally payable on demand, while their assets
(loans and other long-term commitments) are
relatively illiquid. Thus, banks may have trouble
meeting their short-term obligations if they
must redeem too many of their liabilities within
a narrow time span. Because banks maintain
financial linkages with other banks—both do-
mestic and foreign—such liquidity problems
can rapidly spread and grow. As a result, the
world banking system is inevitably a vulnerable
component of the world economy.
All countries need to improve the opera-
tion of banking and other financial markets. In
the developed economies, the primary prob-
lem is to ensure that creditors do not take
undue risks. While that problem is also impor-
tant for the developing economies, the more
general issue for them is how to achieve stan-
dards of best practice, especially with regard to
monitoring exposure to short-term debt.32
It seems clear, in retrospect, that investors
and creditors in the developed economies have,
in many cases, underestimated risks as they
reached for higher yields in emerging markets.
Reform efforts are underway in a number of
forums, but primarily through the Basle Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision and the Finan-
cial Stability Forum. Those efforts are directed
at improving risk assessment and risk manage-
ment, understanding better the operations of
highly leveraged institutions, and encouraging
offshore financial centers to comply with inter-
national standards.
In developing countries, the emphasis has
been on improving fundamentals, such as the
regulation of banks to ensure safety and sound-
ness. One significant step that governments
should take is to remove impediments to the
operation of foreign banks in competition with
domestic institutions. As foreign banks enter a
country they tend to raise the standard of prac-
tice of domestic institutions through competi-
tion. Foreign banks are also likely to be less
susceptible to domestic political pressures to
which local banks are subject and more able to
base lending decisions on the financial sound-
ness of projects.
Another key element in strengthening
financial market stability is the work of the
Basle Committee, which is helping countries
to comply with the “Core Principles for Effec-
tive Banking Supervision”. The main provisions
of the “Core Principles” are outlined in Box 1,
page 20. In addition, the IMF has developed a
framework for financial sector surveillance that
will allow IMF staff to better analyze and sup-
port member country programs of bank super-
vision in the context of Article IV consultations.
BANKRUPTCY
The lack of adequate bankruptcy procedures
in many emerging market countries at best
impedes and at worst stymies the resolution of
financial crises. When creditors lack confidence
in the fair enforcement of bankruptcy proce-
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32.  An ancillary benefit of improved bank supervision in both
developed and developing countries is that better reporting and
monitoring of money laundering and other suspicious activities
could help curb fraud and corruption.
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BOX 1: BASLE CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION
In 1997, the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision, in collaboration with supervisory
authorities in fifteen emerging market coun-
tries, developed twenty-five minimum condi-
tions for an effective bank supervisory system.
These Core Principles for Effective Banking
Supervision are now widely endorsed by central
bank Governors and supervisory authorities
throughout the world. They are intended to
serve as a basic reference for public authorities
worldwide to apply in the supervision of all the
banks within their jurisdictions.
The Core Principles are summarized below.
Preconditions for Effective Banking
Supervision
There should be clear responsibilities and
objectives for each agency involved in the su-
pervision of banking organizations. Each
agency should possess operational indepen-
dence and adequate resources. A suitable legal
framework is also necessary, as are arrange-
ments for sharing information between supervi-
sors and protecting the confidentiality of such
information.
Licensing and Structure
The activities of institutions that are licensed
as banks must be clearly defined, and the licens-
ing authority must have the right to set criteria
and reject applications for establishments that
do not meet the standards. Banking supervisors
should review any changes in the ownership or
controlling interests of existing banks, major
acquisitions or investments by a bank, and cor-
porate affiliations and structures so the bank is
not exposed to undue risks.
Prudential Regulations and Requirements
Regulators must set prudent and appropriate
capital adequacy requirements for all banks.
Those requirements must reflect the risks banks
undertake and must define the components of
capital. For internationally active banks, these
requirements must not be less than those estab-
lished in the Basle Capital Accord.
Banking supervisors must evaluate a bank’s
policies, practices and procedures for: granting
loans and making investments; managing loan
and investment portfolios; evaluating the qual-
ity of assets; maintaining adequate loan loss
provisions and loan loss reserves; and identify-
ing, monitoring, and controlling market risks in
domestic lending and country risks in their
international lending and investment activities.
There should also be adequate information
dures, they have an increased incentive, at the
first sign of financial distress, to liquidate their
claims before others do so. This behavior, when
generalized, adds to financial distress and
panic. In the event of an actual default, a
lender’s inability to repossess collateral under
bankruptcy procedures may put it in financial
jeopardy or even default. When the creditor is
a bank, the potential for financial crisis is
heightened.33
CED urges developing country governments
to establish bankruptcy procedures that are
transparent and even-handed. These proce-
dures should allow the claims of creditors to
be discharged fairly and provide the basis for
the reemployment of productive assets and the
continuation of viable enterprises. Domestic
and international creditors of an insolvent or
bankrupt institution should receive equal and
fair treatment in any workout or debt
restructuring.
Efforts have been underway since 1997 to
encourage countries to adopt a version of a
model law, developed under the auspices of
the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law, that deals with specific prob-
lems of cross-border insolvencies—promoting,
among other things, nondiscrimination against
33. Barry Eichengreen, Toward a New International Financial Ar-
chitecture (Washington, DC: Institute for International Econom-
ics, February 1999) p. 28.
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systems that enable management to identify
concentrations within the portfolio, and supervi-
sors must set prudential limits to restrict bank
exposures to single borrowers or groups of re-
lated borrowers.
There should also be high ethical and profes-
sional standards in the financial sector to pre-
vent the bank from being used, intentionally or
unintentionally, by criminal elements. There
should also be adequate internal controls.
Methods of Ongoing Banking Supervision
Banking supervisors must have: regular con-
tact with bank management; thorough under-
standing of the institution’s operations; a means
of collecting, reviewing, and analyzing pruden-
tial reports and statistical returns from banks;
and a means of independent validation of super-
visory information either through on-site exami-
nations or use of external auditors. Banking
supervisors should also be able to supervise the
banking group on a consolidated basis.
Information Requirements
Each bank should maintain adequate records
drawn up in accordance with consistent ac-
counting policies and practices that enable the
supervisor to obtain a true and fair view of the
SOURCE: Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Core
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Basle, Switzerland:
Bank of International Settlements, September, 1997).
financial condition of the bank. The bank
should publish on a regular basis financial
statements that fairly reflect its condition.
Formal Powers of Supervisors
Banking supervisors must have adequate
measures to take corrective action when banks
fail to meet prudential requirements, when
there are regulatory violations, or where deposi-
tors are threatened in any other way. In ex-
treme circumstances, this should include the
ability to revoke the banking license or recom-
mend its revocation.
Cross-border Banking
Banking supervisors must practice global
consolidated supervision over their internation-
ally active banking organizations. A key compo-
nent of this is establishing contact and
information exchange with the various other
supervisors involved, primarily host country
supervisory authorities. Local operations of
foreign banks must be held to the same high
standards as are required of domestic institu-
tions.
foreigners in bankruptcy proceedings. (See Box
2, page 22.)  In addition, the World Bank has
been assisting governments by providing infor-
mation on insolvency systems, including the
role of bankruptcy courts. Finally, the Interna-
tional Bar Association’s Committee on Insol-
vency and Creditor Rights (Committee J) has
developed the Cross-Border Insolvency Con-
cordat, which provides a framework for coop-
eration in multilateral insolvencies.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In most developing countries, domestic laws
regulating corporate governance are inad-
equate and need to be improved.  CED be-
lieves that governments should establish clear
and viable rules to define the agency relation-
ship between managers and shareholders and
protect the rights of shareholders. The rights
of minority shareholders of corporations that
are predominantly family-owned or part of a
larger cross-ownership group should be pro-
tected.
Corporate governance laws provide the
structure through which the objectives of the
corporation are set and the means by which
those objectives and the monitoring of perfor-
mance are determined. Because recent finan-
cial crises have roots in the borrowing behavior
of domestic firms and banks, corporate gover-
nance has significantly affected the extent of
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the financial problems nations have faced.34
To be effective in monitoring and controlling
the management of a firm and to hold it
accountable for its actions, shareholders must
have the right to reliable information about
the firm and the right to vote their shares. With
laws that protect the rights of minority share-
holders, a country can build on market incen-
tives to check overly risky behavior or other
behavior on the part of managers and other
insiders that could not withstand public scru-
tiny.
The World Bank has led efforts to promote
standards and best practices related to laws
and regulations affecting corporate governance.
In particular, Bank projects have supported
corporate governance reforms in client coun-
tries. Another prominent force for change is
the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). The OECD’s Busi-
ness Advisory Group on Corporate Governance
issued a report in 1998 that identified prin-
ciples of sound corporate governance.35 These
principles are outlined in Box 3. In addition,
the OECD is developing guidelines to improve
practices in member countries and serve as a
reference point for nonmember countries.
In order to promote principles of corporate
governance, the OECD and the World Bank
have joined to create the Global Corporate
Governance Forum, which provides a frame-
work for design and implementation of corpo-
rate governance projects by participating
countries and institutions. The Forum will build
partnerships between public and private-sector
actors by inviting key private-sector figures from
developed and developing countries, and vari-
ous stakeholders from non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs), labor organizations, and
human rights groups to participate in its meet-
ings. Two important initiatives already under-
The United Nations Commission on In-
ternational Trade Law (UNICTRAL) ap-
proved the “Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency” in May 1997. The document was
drafted after two years of discussions among
delegates from 40 countries.
The Model Law is designed to provide
countries with a modern, harmonized, and
fair framework for handling cases of cross-
border insolvency. Most national insolvency
laws are poorly equipped to deal with bank-
ruptcy proceedings with foreign creditors or
debtors. As a result, different or incompat-
ible legal approaches stall or prevent the
rescue of financially troubled businesses,
threatening investment and employment.
The provisions of the Model Law will help
to promote:
• Cooperation between the courts and
other authorities of domestic and foreign
countries;
• Greater legal certainty for trade and
investment;
• Fair and efficient administration of cross-
border insolvencies that protects the
interests of  all creditors and other inter-
ested persons, including the debtor;
• Protection and maximization of the value
of the debtor’s assets; and
• Facilitation of the rescue of financially
troubled businesses.
The law is a legislative text, which can be
incorporated, in whole or in part, into a
country’s existing national insolvency law.
SOURCE: UNICTRAL, “Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency with Guide to Enactment,” available at
www.unictral.org/english/texts/insolven/
ml+guide.htm. See also Deborah Pines, “International
Bankruptcy Law Proposed,” New York Law Journal ,
November 17, 1997.
BOX 2: MODEL LAW ON
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY
34. Kenneth Scott, “Corporate Governance and East Asia,”
paper presented at the World Bank Group-Brookings Confer-
ence, “Preventing Crises in Emerging Markets”, March 26-27,
1999, New York City.
35. OECD, Corporate Governance: Improving Competitiveness and
Access to Capital in Global Markets, (OECD, 1998).
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The Asian financial crisis heightened aware-
ness of the importance of good corporate gov-
ernance, as well as the need for international
standards in this area. To address this need, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) has developed the “Prin-
ciples of Corporate Governance.”
The Principles, meant to be useful to OECD
member and non-member countries alike, are
an outline of the basic conditions for govern-
ments and private-sector participants to refer to
as they evaluate their own “legal, institutional,
regulatory, and company-specific frameworks."
The principles are non-binding and leave flex-
ibility for implementation according to specific
circumstances.
The term corporate governance describes
the relationships between a company’s manage-
ment, its board of directors, shareholders, and
other stakeholders, the rules and incentives
which guide these relationships, and the struc-
ture through which the objectives of the com-
pany are met. Key aspects of good corporate
governance include transparency of corporate
structures and operations, accountability of
management to shareholders, and corporate
responsibility towards employees, creditors,
and the communities in which the company
operates.
The Principles fall under five broad catego-
ries:
The rights of shareholders: all shareholders
BOX 3: OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
should have and utilize their access to rel-
evant information, ability to influence the
behavior of the corporation, and voting
rights.
The equitable treatment of shareholders: all
shareholders (including foreign sharehold-
ers) should be treated fairly by board mem-
bers, management, and controlling
shareholders; and insider trading and self-
dealing should be prohibited.
The role of stakeholders: good corporate
governance should recognize the rights of
stakeholders as established by law and en-
courage active cooperation between corpo-
rations and stakeholders in creating wealth,
jobs, and the sustainability of financially
sound enterprises.
Disclosure and Transparency: timely and
accurate disclosure on all material matters
regarding the corporation, including the
financial situation, performance, ownership,
and governance of the company is essential.
Responsibilities of the Board: the account-
ability of the board to a company and its
shareholders, the effective monitoring of
management by the board, and the strategic
guidance of the company are essential to its
functioning.
SOURCE: OECD, “Principles of Corporate Governance,”
(OECD: June, 1999); available at www.oecd.org/daf/gover-
nance/principles.htm.
way are the Investor Responsibility Taskforce,
which encourages investors to pay more atten-
tion to corporate governance issues to increase
the flow of funds to countries making progress
on reforms, and the Audit and Accounting
Taskforce, created to raise standards world-
wide.
SOCIAL POLICY
Good social policy is important and benefi-
cial to the economic health of a country in
both crisis and non-crisis times. As described
by the G-7 Finance Ministers, “effective social
policy will help provide a foundation for sus-
tainable development, by ensuring that the ben-
efits of globalization are widely shared,
equipping people for change and ensuring that
economies are more robust.”36
Effective social safety nets are an integral
part of crisis resolution. In fact, there is a strong
36. Report of the G-7 Finance Ministers to the Köln Economic
Summit, Strengthening the International Financial Architecture
(Cologne: June 18-20, 1999).
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relationship between a country’s ability to with-
stand economic setbacks, such as a currency
crisis, and the strength of institutions designed
to provide a safety net for those in need.37
When a financial crisis hits, many of the most
vulnerable segments of society are affected.
Workers are unemployed and small businesses
bankrupted. Typically, government revenues
decline and expenditures shift to aid the finan-
cial recovery of banks and commercial busi-
nesses, leaving less public funds to be spent on
social programs such as education, income sup-
port, and public health. Countries need to
establish more comprehensive social safety nets
to better protect and assist vulnerable groups
in time of crisis or significant economic transi-
tion.
To protect the poorest groups in society,
the World Bank has taken the lead in develop-
ing and identifying best practices in social
policy. The Bank produced a draft note of
Principles and Good Practices in Social Policy,
and further development of these principles
and practices has been delegated to the United
Nations as part of the follow-up to the
Copenhagen Declaration of the World Sum-
mit for Social Development. Such practices will
both support economic development gener-
ally and provide the basis for ensuring the
protection of the most vulnerable members of
society as post-crisis adjustment programs are
developed.
The IMF has also acknowledged the impor-
tance of social policy and poverty reduction.
IMF adjustment programs are being examined
to ensure that they provide adequate social
spending in times of crisis. The IMF is collabo-
rating with the World Bank on ways to ensure
that the implementation of social safety nets is
consistent with good fiscal policy and efficient
allocation of government resources. Even in its
non-crisis lending to the world’s poorest coun-
tries, the IMF has changed its Enhanced Struc-
tural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) to a Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) to link
social and economic policies in its consulta-
tions with countries.
The international community also has initi-
ated an effort to provide debt relief to the
world’s poorest countries that are so heavily
burdened with debt payments, mostly to offi-
cial creditors, that they are unable to break out
of the cycle of poverty. The Heavily-Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, for which 36
nations are currently eligible, aims to help coun-
tries that pursue sound economic policies to
reduce their external debt burden to sustain-
able levels.38 At the same time, the initiative
strengthens the link between debt relief and
poverty reduction by integrating IMF-supported
macroeconomic programs into broader pov-
erty reduction efforts. Countries granted debt
relief by bilateral creditors are expected to in-
vest in poverty reduction programs such as
health, education, and other programs address-
ing social needs. (See Box 4.) CED urges devel-
oped country governments to grant relief from
official debt and provide other forms of finan-
cial and technical assistance for the very poor
countries that are trying to establish a founda-
tion for economic growth through improved
domestic policies.
37. Rodrik, The New Global Economy and Developing Countries:
Making Openness Work, pp. 82-98.
38. Forty-one countries are defined as Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries, and thirty-six currently qualify for debt relief. The
HIPC countries are: Angola, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo,
Cote D’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras,
Kenya, Laos, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome
and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania,
Togo, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zambia. See IMF, “Debt
Initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs)”,
September 5, 1999. Available at www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/
hipc.htm
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In September 1996, the Interim and Devel-
opment Committees of the IMF and the World
Bank proposed a program to address the over-
whelming levels of external debt strapping the
world's poorest nations. The Initiative for the
“Heavily Indebted Poor Countries” (HIPC) is
designed to provide assistance to eligible coun-
tries following sound economic policies to help
them reduce their external debt burden to
sustainable levels within a period of six years.39
In most eligible countries, 40 percent of the
population lives below the poverty line.
The HIPC Initiative promises to deal with
the ongoing debt crisis of the world’s poorest
economies by offering assistance in the form of
a reduction in the net present value of claims
on the indebted country. Such assistance will
help to provide the incentive for investment
and broaden domestic support for policy re-
forms. The intent of the program is to relieve
countries of debt owed mostly to official bilat-
eral and multilateral creditors—the G-8 devel-
oped countries, the World Bank, the IMF, and
the regional development banks. Although
little is owed to commercial lenders, the pro-
gram urges them to forgive debt also.
To participate in the program, a country
must implement a World Bank/IMF supported
structural adjustment program, during a six-
year period. At the “decision point”, which
marks the end of the first three years, creditors
re-examine the country’s debt and determine
whether it can exit the HIPC scheme or, if it
cannot, how much debt relief it will need to
reach a sustainable level of debt at its “comple-
tion point”, three years down the line.
Significant progress has been made in
improving the program, particularly regarding
BOX 4: DEBT RELIEF FOR THE POOREST NATIONS: THE HIPC INITIATIVE
debt owed to multilateral creditors. In April
1999, the Boards of the IMF and the World
Bank endorsed proposals to provide “faster,
deeper, and broader” relief. Thirty-six countries
now qualify for debt relief, and they will be
eligible for interim relief between the decision
and completion points, as well as the front-
loading of the delivery of debt relief.
The most revolutionary aspect of the HIPC
Initiative, and the most promising for meeting
social policy goals in countries, is the strong
link between debt relief and poverty reduction.
Debt relief becomes an integral part of poverty
reduction because each country participating
in the HIPC Initiative is required to develop a
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) with the
assistance of the Bank and Fund. The strategy
must ensure consistency between a country’s
macroeconomic policies to foster economic
stability and growth and its social policies, in-
cluding actions targeted at reducing poverty,
and improved access to primary health, educa-
tion, and clean water for the poorest popula-
tions.
So far, 14 countries have entered the initia-
tive, and four countries — Uganda, Bolivia,
Guyana, and Mozambique—have reached their
completion points with the IFIs. Following the
establishment of a debt forgiveness plan by the
G-8 Countries at the Köln Summit in June 1999,
the United States and the United Kingdom
pledged 100 percent official debt relief on
loans to qualifying countries. Other G-8 coun-
tries are expected to make similar pledges.
SOURCE: IMF, “Debt Initiative for the Heavily-Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC)”, September 5, 1999. See also
“Statement of the G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors”, April 26, 1999, at www.g8cologne.de/06/02.
39. A sustainable level of debt has been defined by the World
Bank/IMF as a level at which a country is able to meet its current
and future debt repayment obligations in full without compro-
mising economic growth and without resorting to rescheduling
or building up arrears in the future.
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IMPROVING POLICIES BY RELYING ON MARKETS
This chapter focuses on three policy areas,
each of which has become a focal point for
efforts to help developing countries protect
themselves and the broader international fi-
nancial system from the causes and conse-
quences of financial instability. These policy
areas concern exchange rates, short-term capi-
tal inflows, and the treatment of debts to for-
eign private-sector lenders. Our recom-
mendations for the first two of those policies
are aimed at preventing financial crises. In the
third policy area, our recommendation—which
applies when a crisis has occurred—is aimed at
ensuring the long-term flow of capital to devel-
oping countries.
CED’s approach to these issues is based on
our experiences as leaders of business. Accord-
ingly, our recommendations are based on a
strong preference for market-oriented solu-
tions, not because of an ideological fealty to
markets, but because markets effect adjustment
to unavoidable change with least cost and maxi-
mum benefit. Markets do this in part because
they transmit information rapidly and encour-
age decision makers to correct imbalances be-
fore they grow to crisis proportions.
 Markets rely on accurate and timely infor-
mation. Without such information, markets
transmit false or misleading signals. Thus, the
reforms recommended in this chapter depend
on the success of reforms discussed in the pre-
vious chapter that enhance both the quantity
and quality of information in developing coun-
tries through greater transparency and adher-
ence to international standards of data dis-
semination.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGIMES
The choice of exchange rate policy must be
made by each sovereign nation based on its
evaluation of relative benefits and costs. How-
ever, CED believes that for emerging market
economies that participate substantially in in-
ternational capital markets, floating exchange
rates are generally desirable. They provide the
best means of encouraging speedy and effi-
cient adjustment to changing economic condi-
tions. We recognize the benefits of a fixed
exchange rate for a country that wants to curb
rampant inflation and establish a stable mon-
etary policy or is taking steps to establish a
monetary union. However, we stress that a
country that seeks to maintain a fixed exchange
rate must establish the credibility of its com-
mitment to sound macroeconomic policies.
The institution of a currency board is one way
to establish credibility, but ultimately it is the
willingness to live with the consequences of a
fixed-rate regime that demonstrates the extent
of the commitment. In addition, we recom-
mend that whatever exchange rate regime a
country chooses, it should build sufficient in-
ternational reserves to weather crises and
should seek to establish lines of credit with
private lenders that can be called upon in case
of emergency.
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Policy makers in developing countries
should understand that the choice of exchange
rate regime is but one element in the overall
set of economic policies that a country must
establish, including monetary policy and poli-
cies affecting the openness of capital markets.
The overall set of policies should encourage
non-inflationary economic growth, high em-
ployment, and efficient resource allocation.
The exchange rate alone cannot meet all of
these goals simultaneously.
A floating exchange rate, determined pri-
marily by market conditions of supply and de-
mand, has significant advantages for a large
diversified economy with a relatively small part
of its output engaged in international com-
merce, such as the United States. A floating
rate allows a country greater independence in
its monetary policy, at least in principle. In
large economies, changes in the value of the
currency have relatively small economic effects,
especially since derivative markets in options
and futures transactions allow exporters and
importers to hedge against foreign exchange
movements. Such hedging brings greater sta-
bility to the underlying real markets for goods
and services, which are of primary concern.
Our support for flexible exchange rates for
smaller economies results in part from the prob-
lems they have encountered with fixed rates.
An advantage of a floating exchange rate is
that it removes a potential source of excessive
capital inflows, which occur when lenders (and
borrowers) accept the government’s pledge of
a fixed exchange rate uncritically and underes-
timate the risk that the currency may be deval-
ued. The illusory protection against devaluation
given by a fixed exchange rate was a significant
cause of the excessive inflow of short-term capi-
tal that set the stage for financial crisis in Thai-
land and other countries of East Asia. As it
happened, governments were unable to main-
tain the fixed rate. The subsequent devalua-
tions typically overshot and imposed high costs
on the domestic economy when short-term capi-
tal left the country. In this manner, the coun-
tries of East Asia (and later Brazil,) were forced
to abandon their pegged exchange rate re-
gimes and suffered declining production, high
unemployment, and domestic inflation.
We believe that economic policy in devel-
oping countries, especially those that are ac-
tively engaged in international markets, can
benefit from information conveyed by changes
in the exchange rate. A sustained decline in
the value of the currency often should signal to
government leaders that fiscal and monetary
policies might need to change. Another ben-
efit is that forward currency markets will de-
velop more fully as countries allow their
currencies to float. These forward markets will
facilitate hedging against the risk of change in
a currency’s value and bring more stability to
the markets for traded goods and services.
We also believe that developed international
capital markets allow floating exchange rates
to provide many of the benefits previously at-
tributed to fixed rates. The principal benefits
traditionally credited to fixed exchange rates
are lower transactions costs due to greater cer-
tainty regarding future prices and the disci-
pline on monetary policy provided by the
external commitment to maintain the rate.
Now, however, well-developed forward ex-
change markets can lower transactions costs by
allowing participants to insure the future value
of a currency. In addition, a strong discipline
on monetary policy is provided by the knowl-
edge that an inappropriate policy will cause a
sudden and large capital outflow, which (as
noted above) will have a large impact on the
exchange rate and interest rates, with large
economic costs. Thus, for many countries, fixed
rates provide few advantages over floating rates,
but pose a greater risk of instability and crisis.
Despite our clear preference for floating
exchange rates, we recognize that a fixed ex-
change rate may be warranted in certain cir-
cumstances.40 Not all countries will be able to
sustain a commitment to sound macroeco-
40. Jeffrey Frankel, “No Single Currency Regime is Right for
All Countries or at All Times,” NBER Working Paper #7338,
September 1999, p. 9.
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nomic policies without the discipline of a fixed
exchange rate policy or the institutional struc-
ture that may be put in place to give that policy
credibility. A fixed exchange rate has been
used effectively by countries that needed to
overcome hyperinflation or vulnerability to vola-
tile fluctuations in the value of domestic cur-
rency. It has also been employed to bind
together politically separate units (countries
or states) that are, or want to be, economically
integrated.
Our recommendation emphasizes that a
fixed exchange rate policy must be credible to
be effective. It is not the fixed rate, as such,
that benefits the economy; commitment to a
non-inflationary monetary policy provides the
benefit. There are many ways to establish the
credibility of that commitment. As pointed out
above, a credible monetary policy can even be
established under a floating rate regime—the
United States has done so. For some countries,
however, such credibility can only be estab-
lished through a permanent institutional
change. Argentina, for example, has had rea-
sonably successful results since it adopted a
currency board in 1991 to combat hyperinfla-
tion, although it was unable to use monetary
policy to help pull itself out of a deep recession
in 1999. 41 In the case of Argentina and other
countries that have adopted currency boards,
what has made that policy work is the
government’s commitment to live with the eco-
nomic consequences.
Some Latin American leaders have sug-
gested going a step beyond the currency board
to adopting the U.S. dollar as their nation’s
official currency, a step known as dollarization.
That policy is much more controversial than a
currency board, because it would permanently
cede monetary authority to a foreign country.
In some circumstances, dollarization can ben-
efit a country. However, it should not be viewed
as a cure for a country’s economic problems.
Typically, many policy reforms, ranging from
fiscal to structural, will need to be carried out
to make dollarization a success. From the U.S.
perspective, hemisphere-wide adoption of a
single currency could hold substantial benefits,
but the conditions for that step lie well in the
future. (See Box 5, page 30, for a more com-
plete analysis.)
CAPITAL INFLOWS
The economic crisis in East Asia prompted,
almost immediately, a reexamination of the
role that foreign capital—especially short-term
capital—plays in emerging market economies.
With fixed exchange rates, capital at first may
flow too easily into a country and then, when
conditions seem unfavorable, flow too easily
out. When a substantial volume of capital sud-
denly flees a country, interest rates rise. At
extremely high rates of interest—short-term
rates reaching 25-50 percent are not uncom-
mon—many economic activities become un-
profitable. When firms cannot obtain working
capital to finance inventory, they are forced to
stop production and lay off workers. At the
same time, the value of the nation’s currency
comes under overwhelming pressure, as the
demand for foreign exchange outstrips the
available supply. If the government attempts to
defend the fixed-rate currency by raising inter-
est rates or cutting back government expendi-
tures, it reinforces the contraction in economic
activity already under way.
Although governmental controls on capital
flows tend to be anathema to investors, some
forms of regulation of short-term capital in-
flows may be useful to shift the term structure
of capital away from short-term obligations and
dampen the size of very large inflows while a
country is preparing itself for open capital mar-
kets. CED believes that emerging market coun-
41. A currency board only issues domestic currency to the extent
that it is fully backed by foreign assets. The strict rules that
govern the issuance of domestic currency by the currency board
are needed to give the board credibility. In general, those rules
include: an exchange rate that is fixed by law; a 100 percent
reserve policy, stipulating that each dollar’s worth of domestic
currency be backed by a dollar’s worth of reserves in the chosen
anchor currency; and a self-correcting balance of payments
mechanism, in which a payments deficit automatically contracts
the money supply.
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tries should strengthen their domestic finan-
cial systems and work toward the goal of open
capital markets. However, a temporary tax on
short-term capital inflows may help a country
with a weak financial system to avoid economic
damage associated with the volatility of short-
term capital while it is engaged in reform.
The Argument for Unrestricted
Capital Flows
As in any market, economic benefits arise
when individuals are free to engage in capital
market transactions. Barriers to such transac-
tions create economic costs. At least three spe-
cific benefits arguably derive from international
capital mobility: a more efficient allocation of
resources, imposition of market discipline on
the economy importing the capital, and diver-
sification of risk for the capital-exporting
economy. In addition, capital controls tend to
be difficult to enforce. They can be circum-
vented in practice by a variety of evasions or
illegal actions, often involving graft and cor-
ruption, which undermine the political and
legal institutions generally. 42
The free international flow of capital allows
financial resources to go to their most valuable
use. That makes more efficient use of scarce
resources and increases total economic out-
put. Openness to capital flows lowers the cost
of capital. Because most emerging market
economies are characterized by a scarcity of
capital and plentiful opportunities for invest-
ment, they typically need external capital. Be-
tween 1990 and 1997 net long-term private
capital flows to developing countries surged
from about $42 billion to $256 billion, as many
of those countries dropped controls on capital
and otherwise opened their economies to for-
eign investment. Gross flows during this pe-
riod reached an annual rate of $400 billion.43
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42. See, for example, the comments of Richard Cooper at the
IMF Economic Forum, “Capital Account Liberalization: What’s
the Best Stance?” October 2, 1998; at http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/tr/1998/TR981002A.HTM
43. Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President,
1999, p. 221.
By opening its border to foreign capital,
the receiving economy subjects itself to the
discipline of international markets. Domestic
projects seeking capital must compete with
other projects around the globe for financing.
That tends to improve the quality of the
projects and their management. At the same
time, the domestic government gets direct feed-
back from markets on the soundness of its
economic policies as private investors signal
their evaluation of the economic environment
by investing or withdrawing their capital. Ben-
efits also accrue to the capital exporting
economy and its investors, since owners of
capital can reduce risk by exporting capital to
a diverse group of countries and increase prof-
its by serving local markets.
The benefits associated in principle with
the free flow of capital prompted the IMF
Interim Committee (the committee of mem-
ber-country finance ministers that oversees the
operations of the IMF) to issue a statement
endorsing capital account convertibility and,
in particular, seeking to add IMF jurisdiction
over capital account transactions to the IMF’s
Articles of Agreement.44
Both economic theorists and practitioners,
however, have challenged these claims that
unfettered capital mobility produces large ben-
efits. Theoreticians have argued that at least
one of the chief benefits derived from interna-
tional capital flows, greater efficiency in the
allocation of global resources, is sometimes
more illusory than real.45 To the degree that
developing countries do not have efficient
markets, they may misallocate imported capi-
tal, negating the potential gain. In addition,
experience has shown that, unlike free trade,
free mobility of short-term capital can impose
significant costs as a result of instability, as
noted in Chapter 2.
44. The Hong Kong Declaration of the Interim Committee of
the IMF, September, 1997.
45. See Jagdish Bhagwati, “The Capital Myth,” Foreign Affairs,
May/June 1998, Vol. 77, No. 3; see also Dani Rodrik, The New
Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness Work.
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Many policy makers and economic analysts
have concluded that developing countries that
seek to establish a credible fixed exchange rate
regime will need to enact rules and mecha-
nisms, such as a currency board, that firmly link
issuance of domestic currency to a major for-
eign currency. The extreme form of such a
linkage is to relinquish completely the use of
the domestic currency in favor of a foreign
currency. A specific suggestion by Argentine
President Menem that his country might want
to use the U.S. dollar as its domestic currency
has given rise to substantial discussion and
analysis of “dollarization.”
Dollarization is not a panacea for resolving
any international financial issues. However, in
some limited cases dollarization may be a valu-
able means for an emerging market nation to
stabilize its monetary system. A country can
dollarize without help from the United States.
However, because it would lose seigniorage and
it may want to ensure an adequate supply of
currency, a country may seek the agreement of
the United States.46  CED recommends that the
United States employ a case-by-case approach
to other countries’ desires to dollarize. CED
supports the current policy, as articulated by
the Federal Reserve and the Treasury, which
clearly notifies countries that want to dollarize
that they should not expect special consider-
ation from the United States with respect to the
conduct of monetary policy, bank supervision,
or access to the discount window of the Federal
Reserve.
In essence dollarization is a domestic policy
decision to establish a credible monetary policy
by “importing” that policy from the United
States. In itself, it does not affect the interna-
tional financial system; its effects are mostly
limited to the country that dollarizes and to the
United States.
Considerations for the Dollarizing Country
Given the U.S. position, dollarization is a
policy choice that other countries must make
after evaluating its costs and benefits for their
own economies. If unilaterally adopted,
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BOX 5. USE OF THE DOLLAR AS A DOMESTIC CURRENCY
dollarization would, on the one hand, mean
complete surrender of monetary independence
and the loss of seigniorage earnings, which
could be a significant factor for some countries.
On the other hand, it could help prevent the
emergence of a financial crisis and lower the
cost of credit.
One of the arguments in favor of dollar-
ization for some countries is that the costs of
doing so may be very low because the change
would be small. Many countries already have a
significant portion of bank deposits held in
dollars: Panama and Liberia are fully dollarized
already, ratios of 30-60 percent are common in
the transition economies of Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union, and Argentina is be-
tween 40 and 50 percent. In addition, to the
extent that emerging market countries borrow
abroad in dollars, their foreign liabilities are
already denominated in dollars. Further, for
countries that already have exchange rates that
are fixed through a currency board, such as
Argentina, the additional loss of policy flexibil-
ity implied by dollarization, would be small.
The other major argument, of course, is that
the country will garner significant benefits from
dollarization. Dollarization may add credibility
and discipline to a country’s monetary policy.
Analysts note that Panama is the only Latin
American country with an active market for 30-
year fixed rate mortgages. Argentine experts
believe that dollarization would lower interest
rates, which for peso deposits have averaged
nearly 1.5 percentage points above equivalent
dollar deposits over the past two years, and have
gone as high as a 4 percentage point spread.
Other benefits, in the form of closer trade and
investment linkages to the United States are also
expected.
Considerations for the United States
Some small direct financial benefits would
accrue to the United States as a result of an-
other country’s decision to use the dollar as its
currency. These benefits are primarily in the
form of seigniorage earned by the federal gov-
ernment on coin and currency in circulation.
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For the United States those amounts would be
small relative to the current amounts of such
earnings and should probably not play a signifi-
cant role in determining the U.S. attitude to-
ward dollarization.
More important is whether the United States
wants to accept or promote the increased eco-
nomic and political linkages that are likely to
follow as a consequence of dollarization. Shar-
ing the same currency is likely to reduce the
cost of trade and investment with countries that
dollarize, in part because it eliminates risks due
to exchange rate movements. In that context,
economic policy makers in the United States
almost certainly will come under pressure to
adjust policy to meet the economic needs of
countries that have dollarized. A political risk
for the United States is that in difficult eco-
nomic times elsewhere, the lost ability to con-
trol domestic monetary policy locally will direct
resentment and blame to the United States,
where monetary policy is made. That would
produce new political tensions in a system that
already must balance a large number of com-
peting domestic political interests.
Two Final Notes
Dollarization advocates implicitly assume
that U.S. monetary authorities will always follow
a prudent course. We note that such an assump-
tion is not based on the long historical record
of the Federal Reserve, which has not always
acted with the wisdom and steadiness shown by
the current Fed Board and Open Market Com-
mittee.
We also note that conditions most conducive
to dollarization are not present in countries
that currently are considering it. The condi-
tions for a successful common currency area are
more like those in Europe than those of the
Western Hemisphere today: a higher degree of
labor mobility, free trade, exposure to common
economic conditions (including external
shocks), and the potential for stabilizing fiscal
policy between regions with income disparities.
Should those conditions develop in this hemi-
sphere, we would view the adoption of a single
currency as a positive event. 46. Seigniorage is generally defined as the revenue derived from
the difference between the cost of issuing coin and currency and
its face value.
Regulating Short-Term
Capital Inflows
Although we believe that developing
country governments should work toward
open capital markets and more efficient in-
ternal markets, we see several reasons why
they may need to regulate the flow of short-
term capital while they are strengthening
their domestic markets. Governments are
justified in such regulation when large short-
term capital movements impose heavy costs
on the larger society. As discussed above,
the costs of a sudden large outflow of capital
fall mostly on businesses and workers, who
lose income and employment. The costs to
the government, or taxpayers, are also high,
as the cost of safety net programs, including
deposit insurance and other financial res-
cue programs, rise. Costs are greater still
when one includes the risk of contagion and
transmission of the crisis to other countries.
Since a crisis can be precipitated when the
monetary authority is unable to meet the
demand for foreign exchange, the govern-
ment has an interest in ensuring that the
term structure of foreign debt will allow it to
meet that demand.
We are concerned, however, that a limit
on short-term foreign borrowing alone may
prove ineffectual or even lead to distortions
in other financial instruments. Countries that
regulate capital inflows should be aware that
investors are wary of such regulations. The
regulation of short-term capital flows is likely
to be more effective when it is part of a fair,
stable, and comprehensive strategy. Such a
strategy would include improvements in the
conduct of monetary policy and the regula-
tion and supervision of the financial sector.
The ultimate goal should be to strengthen
the system and pave the way for open and
uncontrolled capital markets.
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Controls on the inflow of capital should be
used to encourage a longer holding period,
rather than to regulate the purpose for which
capital will be used. If administered as a tax,
rather than as a quantitative restriction, inflow
controls can allow continued access to foreign
capital, and capital account convertibility can
be maintained. Taxes, in general, distort eco-
nomic efficiency less than quantitative controls
and are an efficient means of recognizing hid-
den (or external) costs. In addition, after a tax
is imposed, markets, rather than further gov-
ernment intervention, would allocate resources.
Market allocation would result in sounder and
more efficient resource allocation decisions.
Furthermore, as will be discussed more fully
below, a duration tax provides a simple way to
make it more costly for foreign private-sector
lenders to withdraw capital in anticipation of,
or during, a financial crisis.
However, we strongly believe that, in most
circumstances, only capital regulations on the
inflow of capital, not the outflow, are desirable.
Outflow controls have the effect of discourag-
ing the inflow of all forms of capital, including
foreign direct investment, because of the in-
ability to repatriate profits. Their use can only
be justified in exceptional and rare circum-
stances, such as to stem the illegal flood of
money leaving a country, as in Russia, or as a
temporary measure to halt a financial panic.
The most frequently cited example of a sys-
tem that regulates the inflow of foreign capital
is the one operated until recently by Chile.
Although opinions vary with respect to the over-
all benefits provided by the Chilean system, it
appears that Chile was able to discourage the
inflow of short-term capital, to some degree,
during the 1990s.47
Starting in 1991, Chile’s central bank im-
posed a tax on foreign debt in the form of a
required one-year non-interest-bearing deposit
at the central bank of 20 percent of the loan.
The reserve requirement provided a strong
incentive for loans to be made for longer than
one year. The requirement was subsequently
raised to 30 percent and the coverage was ex-
tended to cover all foreign inflows except non-
speculative foreign direct investment, which is
of longer duration. Other forms of prudential
regulation of banking and finance comple-
mented the reserve requirement, and the policy
was part of a broader strategy of economic
reform in Chile. For example, except for trade
credits, banks could not lend domestically in
foreign currency. When all capital flows dimin-
ished in 1998, the reserve requirement was
dropped to zero, but the system remains in
place should it be needed again.
TREATMENT OF FOREIGN LOAN
CONTRACTS
Perhaps the most contentious issue facing
would-be reformers relates to the treatment of
the private sector of the advanced industrial
economies, the primary source of external capi-
tal flowing into emerging markets. Since the
resolution of the Mexican crisis in 1995, many
observers, official and unofficial, have proposed
ways to force private-sector lenders to bear more
of the costs of a crisis.48 Proponents of such so-
called bail-ins claim that the imposition of
greater costs on foreign investors would serve
at least three functions. First, it would mitigate
the effects of moral hazard (discussed on page
33). Second, it would reduce the demand for
scarce foreign exchange. Third, it would, to
some, provide a more equitable distribution of
the burden of adjustment between foreign and
domestic interests.
47. A full examination of both the Chilean experience with
capital controls and the economic literature assessing that expe-
rience is contained in IMF Working Paper WP/99/52, Francisco
Nadal-De Simone and Piritta Sorsa, “A Review of Capital
Account Restrictions in Chile in the 1990s,” (IMF, April 1999).
48. See, for example, Report of the G-7 Finance Ministers to the
Koln Economic Summit, Strengthening the International Financial
Architecture; Barry Eichengreen, Toward a New International Finan-
cial Architecture; and Report of an Independent Task Force Spon-
sored by the Council on Foreign Relations, Safeguarding Prosper-
ity in a Global Financial System (Washington, DC: 1999).
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Bail-Ins and Moral Hazard
When the IMF and other crisis lenders, such
as the United States, provide loans to a country
in financial crisis, proceeds from the those loans
may be used to pay off foreign currency debts
to foreign private-sector lenders. Such loans
have drawn substantial criticism because they
are seen as a bailout for foreign lenders. In
particular, critics claim that IMF loans increase
the likelihood of future crises because private-
sector lenders develop an expectation that they
will be protected against losses. If lenders are
always repaid, they may become less careful
than they should be in evaluating loans and
provide too much credit at high risk. Similarly,
borrowers may become lax in evaluating their
credit needs and the consequences of not keep-
ing up with payments. These attitudes, which
have come to be known as “moral hazard,” set
the stage for a financial crisis.
The argument that moral hazard causes fi-
nancial crises has prompted many proposals to
curb it, ranging from a mandatory imposition
of losses on foreign lenders and investors to
the elimination of the IMF. However, these
proposals ignore the fact that foreign investors
and lenders have in fact sustained large costs
in recent crises. According to the Institute of
International Finance (IIF), in the East Asian
and Russian financial crises foreign equity in-
vestors lost an estimated $240 billion and for-
eign lenders (banks and other creditors) lost
about $110 billion (see Box 6, page 34). The
mandatory imposition of additional costs is not
a necessary ingredient of a crisis resolution
strategy. It may, in fact, make crises more likely
if investors and lenders react strongly to changes
in economic conditions that could lead to bail-
ins. Moreover, to the extent that countries regu-
late short-term capital inflows through
Chilean-style taxes and foreign lenders try to
withdraw their money early, bail-ins will auto-
matically occur through the tax system.
From a longer-term perspective, efforts to
impose costs on foreign private-sector lenders
during a crisis would most likely discourage
foreign investors from future lending. In par-
ticular, we are concerned that proposals that
create a higher probability, or in some cases a
certainty, of significant losses would lower the
supply and increase the cost of capital for
emerging markets. In our view, most so-called
bail-in proposals are misguided. It makes little
sense to encourage countries, on the one hand,
to put in place policies that are meant to at-
tract foreign private capital and, on the other
hand, to repel that capital through imposing
additional costs on it. Any new policy should
recognize the constructive role played by for-
eign lenders in normal times and the destruc-
tive effects that would follow from mandating
losses.
A Specific Proposal for International
Bond Contracts
One proposal for bailing in foreign private-
sector lenders has drawn considerable atten-
tion. It would require so-called collective action
clauses in bond contracts to provide a means
of creditor coordination in the event that a
borrower appears unable to pay its debt. This
proposal is prominent among reforms recom-
mended by the Council on Foreign Relations.49
It calls for a clause in international bond con-
tracts that would spell out procedures for col-
lective representation of creditors, such as
bondholder councils, qualified majority vot-
ing, or sharing clauses that limit the rights of
dissident creditors to disrupt workout agree-
ments. Part of the motivation for requiring
that bonds have a collective action clause is to
make it clear to lenders that they might not
always be repaid, thus reducing moral hazard.
Collective action clauses would also speed up
debt rescheduling, which could help speed eco-
nomic recovery. The requirement for collec-
tive action clauses, which are currently a feature
of British-style bonds, would have to be im-
posed by law in the United States. Bonds issued
49. Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the
Council on Foreign Relations, Safeguarding Prosperity in a Global
Financial System (Washington, DC: 1999).
34
Improving Global Financial Stability
In principle, moral hazard is present when-
ever a guarantee of insurance against loss is
made. Thus, if lenders and borrowers come to
view IMF stabilization loans as insurance against
loss, they will tend to engage in more credit activ-
ity than warranted by actual conditions. However,
CED has been unable to find convincing evi-
dence that moral hazard based in the interna-
tional financial system has played a role in
encouraging too much lending prior to any of
the recent financial crises with the exception of
Russia, which should be viewed as a unique
case.50 The little research that has been con-
ducted on this topic finds no evidence that moral
hazard induced by the resolution of the Mexican
crisis had any effect on risk taking in emerging
markets in general.51 Even the IMF has con-
cluded that moral hazard based in crisis resolu-
tion programs was not much of a factor in the
recent crises in Asia:
“International equity investors and holders
of long-term debt instruments also do not
seem to be substantially motivated by the
prospect of international financial rescue
operations. In fact, with stock markets and
exchange rates plummeting, between mid-
1997 and early 1998 the value of foreign
portfolio investments in some Asian mar-
kets fell by half to two-thirds. There was
never any reasonable basis for expecting
that investors in equities would be shielded
from such losses by government bailouts or
international assistance. Similarly, bond
investors clearly do not expect to be com-
pensated for the immediate consequences
of a crisis.”52
News reports and other data show that foreign
creditors were not sheltered from losses in the
recent crises.  Even foreign banks, which have
been viewed by some as immune from financial
loss because they typically provide funds in the
form of very short-term interbank loans, were
forced to book substantial losses and penalized
by market traders who sold down the value of
their stocks. Because they were heavily commit-
ted to Asian borrowers, Japanese banks are re-
ported to have booked losses of about $10 billion
in 1997. In the United States, a sampling of data
by CED on changes in stock prices for major
BOX 6: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE OF MORAL HAZARD
banks indicates that banks that were most heavily
exposed in emerging markets suffered substantial
declines in the value of their stock compared to
banks that were much less exposed. Between
June 1997 and August 1998, U.S. banks had to set
aside hundreds of millions of dollars in provi-
sions for bad loans.53
Estimates by the IIF show that foreign interests
have already been bailed in. Losses by equity
investors in the East Asian and Russian crises may
have amounted to about $240 billion. Losses by
international banks are estimated to have been
$60 billion; losses by other private creditors, in-
cluding bondholders, are estimated at $50 bil-
lion.54 These amounts are far from trivial, even if
they are smaller than domestic losses of income.
Thus, recent experience should, at least for some
time, curb any incentive to engage in risky lend-
ing. Indeed, the problem may turn from one of
curbing excess lending to one of encouraging
sufficient lending.
The lack of evidence and the existence of
large private-sector losses do not, however, prove
the absence of moral hazard. Aside from crisis
lending by the IMF, other sources of moral haz-
ard may exist. For example, earlier in this chap-
ter we identified a fixed exchange rate policy as a
potential source of moral hazard, because it pur-
ports to guarantee a set value for the domestic
currency. Strong evidence exists that the combi-
nation of fixed exchange rates and high domestic
interest rates induced excessive capital flows to
some Asian countries through what is known as
the carry trade.55 To some extent recent experi-
ence should dampen investors beliefs in the fixity
of exchange rates. Adopting CED’s recommenda-
tion for flexible rates would go even further to-
ward resolving this problem. Perhaps more
important, other actions by governments of crisis
countries may have created other sources of
moral hazard. For example, when Korea guaran-
teed the liabilities of its banks and major corpora-
tions, it shifted the costs from private lenders and
borrowers to the government, thus potentially
encouraging more future private lending than
may be warranted. As discussed in Chapter 3 and
elsewhere in this report, better domestic policies
are needed to prevent future crises.
35
Chapter 4: Improving Policies by Relying on Markets
in the United States usually require unanimous
consent to be rescheduled, which makes such
action very difficult.
In general, bonds issued by private-sector
entities pose no new policy issues. In principle,
defaults on corporate bonds can be resolved by
either voluntary arrangements, such as debt-
for-equity swaps, or a domestic bankruptcy pro-
cedure that has clear rules and is administered
fairly by an independent judiciary. However,
bonds issued by the public sector—sovereign
issues—do present unique problems.
In the case of sovereign bonds, neither debt-
for-equity swaps nor bankruptcy proceedings
are options; governments do not issue equity,
do not provide real collateral, and are only
“liquidated or restructured” through a politi-
cal, rather than financial, process. For that rea-
son, credit problems have been worked out
under special arrangements through creditor
clubs or other means. The collective action
problem—namely that creditors and other own-
ers of financial assets, including domestic resi-
dents, have an incentive to export their capital
before others do, or to take advantage of oth-
ers’ willingness to accept workouts—is particu-
larly acute with regard to sovereign bonds.
CED believes that the United States and
50. IMF loans to Russia were clearly based on political consider-
ations and rightly viewed by many as an extension of U.S. foreign
policy. Ironically, the one case where investors may have been
induced to make loans because of moral hazard is also the one
case where investors took substantial losses because the country
defaulted on its loans without being rescued by the IMF.
51. Xiaoming Alan Zhang, “Testing for “Moral Hazard” in Emerg-
ing Markets Lending,” IIF Research Papers No. 99-1 (Institute
for International Finance, August 1999). See also, Remarks of
William R. Cline, “Private Sector Participation in the Prevention
and Resolution of Financial Crises,” prepared for the IMF Con-
ference on Key Issues in Reform of the International Monetary
and Financial System, Washington, DC, May 28-29, 1999.
52. IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 1998. For a similar analysis,
see Richard Cooper, Speech at the Committee for Economic
Development Forum on Designing a New International Finan-
cial Architecture, New York City, May 1999.
53. “Russia’s Moves Shake Growing Involvement of U.S.,” Ameri-
can Banker, August 18, 1998.
54. Institute for International Finance, Report of the Working Group
on Financial Crises in Emerging Markets (IIF, January 1999) p. 61.
55. IMF, International Capital Markets, September 1998, p. 44.
other countries where international bonds are
issued should leave the decision of whether to
use collective action clauses in international
bond contracts to market participants, rather
than mandating their inclusion. There are now,
and should continue to be, ample opportuni-
ties for market participants to choose the form
of bond contract they prefer on a voluntary
basis. Mandating an easier path for collective
action may make rescheduling easier in the
short term, but is likely to be damaging to
emerging markets’ access to funds over the
long term. We recognize that bond reschedul-
ing may be necessary from time to time and we
expect that some lenders and borrowers will
choose contracts that would lower the cost of
such rescheduling through collective action
arrangements. The choice of whether to ac-
cept those arrangements should be subject to
negotiation, not mandated by public officials.
We believe that mandating such clauses
would erode the discipline of repayment and
make it too easy for a government to choose
rescheduling.56 Rescheduling should not be
made too easy, lest debtors lose the discipline
needed to maintain regular debt payments or,
alternatively, creditors reduce the supply of
credit for the same reason. Bond payments
have neither been a significant factor in the
recent crises, nor would relief from such pay-
ments significantly assist a country in financial
trouble. The annual amortized value of Euro-
bonds due from emerging market countries is
estimated to be $30-40 billion. By contrast, those
countries’ stock of short-term external debt is
estimated to be about $500 billion.57 Although
56. British-style bond issues allow 65 percent to 85 percent of
holders to vote to restructure bond contracts under various
conditions. American-style bond issues typically require at least
95 percent of bondholders to agree to renegotiate the debt.
American-style bonds also give investors greater ability to sue
issuers who do not pay. See Mitchell Martin, “Wall Street Sees
Red at U.S. Plan for Bondholders to Accept More Risk,”
International Herald Tribune, April 26, 1999.
57. Remarks of William R. Cline, “Private Sector Participation in
the Prevention and Resolution of Financial Crises,” prepared for
the IMF Conference on Key Issues in Reform of the Interna-
tional Monetary and Financial System, Washington, DC, May 28-
29, 1999.
36
Improving Global Financial Stability
the stock of short-term debt is unlikely to be
demanded for repayment all at once, since
most of it is rolled over upon maturity, it repre-
sents a large overhang of liabilities that could
be demanded for repayment.
We are pleased to see that our position is
currently reflected in the views of Treasury
Secretary Summers, who has coupled his sup-
port for market-based bond contracts with a
warning:
“We have become convinced that it is not
appropriate for the official sector to mandate
the terms of debt contracts between countries
and their creditors. But lenders and borrowers
alike must recognize that if they choose con-
tractual arrangements that are costly and inef-
ficient in the event of failures, the official sector
will not be prepared to shoulder the conse-
quences.”58
58. Lawrence Summers, “The Right Kind of IMF for a Stable
Global Financial System” Remarks at the London Business School,
London, England, December 14, 1999
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IMPROVING THE IMF
The role of the IMF cannot be viewed in
isolation from other aspects of the interna-
tional financial system. How the IMF fits into
that system depends critically on how the other
parts of the system operate. In some ways the
IMF is a residual institution in the market-
based international financial system—one
whose role and responsibilities begin where
the others' end. If all parts of the system worked
ideally, there might be no need for the IMF.
 In earlier chapters we emphasized the need
for each nation to take responsibility for im-
proving its own economic policies and pro-
posed specific steps they should take. As
governments carry out those reforms the de-
mands on the IMF should diminish somewhat.
But we know that financial markets will not
operate perfectly even with reform. Thus, we
conclude that a strong International Monetary
Fund is indispensable to the continued stabil-
ity and vitality of the international financial
system. When a country is faced with a finan-
cial panic that it is unable to resolve on its own,
the IMF should be prepared and financially
able to act.
As this project neared completion, Secre-
tary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers out-
lined for the first time the Administration’s
views on the future role of the IMF.59 Those
views are very similar to the recommendations
presented here. Secretary Summers focuses on
six areas:
• A greater focus on promoting the flow of
information from governments to markets
and investors.
• Attention to financial vulnerability as well
as macro-economic fundamentals.
• A more selective financing role, focused on
emergency situations.
• Greater emphasis on catalyzing market-
based solutions.
• A more limited role in the poorest coun-
tries, focused on growth and poverty reduc-
tion.
• Modernization of the IMF as an institution.
The analysis below spells out CED’s views
on these critical areas of reform.
THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF THE
IMF: CONSULTATION AND
LIMITED FINANCIAL SUPPORT
The Bretton Woods Agreement, which cre-
ated the IMF and World Bank, envisioned the
role of the IMF as limited primarily to financ-
ing current account deficits in a system based
on fixed (but ultimately adjustable) exchange
rates.60  That is the role the IMF played until
the larger industrialized countries abandoned
fixed exchange rates in 1973. Since 1973, the
IMF has focused primarily on developing coun-
59. ibid
60. For an informative discussion of the history and current
issues facing the World Bank and IMF, see Anne O. Krueger,
“Whither the World Bank and the IMF?” Journal of Economic
Literature, Vol. XXXVI, (December 1998) pp. 1983-2020.
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tries, many of which have retained some form
of fixed exchange regime, and especially on
those countries that have reached an advanced
stage of global economic integration.  IMF lend-
ing usually carries some conditionality—that
is, the borrowing country typically has to agree
to some performance conditions before a loan
is approved. In addition, the IMF was, and
remains, a leading source of research and analy-
sis on international financial problems.
Periodically, member countries have agreed
to add resources to the IMF. In 1960, the IMF’s
Articles of Agreement were amended by the
General Arrangements to Borrow, which added
resources to the IMF that could be used in the
case of sudden capital outflows. In 1987, in the
aftermath of the debt crisis of the 1980s, the
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
(ESAF) was created. The ESAF was intended to
address structural problems by providing fi-
nancial support to the IMF’s poorest members
at longer terms and lower rates than that avail-
able through normal channels.61 At the start of
1999 the IMF implemented a quota increase
and “New Arrangements to Borrow,” which
added about $90 billion to the Fund’s ability to
meet short-term liquidity crises. It has also ini-
tiated a new credit line, the Contingent Credit
Line (CCL), which is intended to support mem-
bers with fundamentally sound economies that
are concerned about their vulnerability to con-
tagion. Such support is expected to help pre-
vent contagion and ensuing financial crises.
In general, IMF programs are characterized
by a number of common features.  Financial
support typically is given as part of an overall
program that includes macroeconomic policy
adjustments on the part of the borrowing coun-
try. Countries that have balance of payments
problems almost invariably expand consump-
tion or investment too rapidly, as evidenced by
an excess of imports. Thus, IMF programs gen-
erally are designed to suppress demand by im-
posing fiscal and monetary restraint, or to switch
demand from foreign to domestic suppliers
through devaluation. Recent experience has
caused some IMF officials to rethink how to
respond to situations where the crisis may be
due to financial speculation rather than an
overheated economy, or where an economy
has already fallen into recession. In those cases,
restrictive policies may be inappropriate.
In part, because of the negotiations neces-
sary to reach agreement and its system of inter-
nal review and voting, IMF programs often
take time to develop. In addition, loans are
generally limited to a fixed percent of the
country’s quota, with limits on amounts that
can be borrowed both annually (100 percent
of quota) and over several years (300 percent
of quota). One of the significant features of
recent financial crises is the increase in the
scale of financial commitments. The rescue
package for Mexico put together by the IMF
and the United States in 1995 equaled about
$50 billion. IMF-led financing for Asia, Russia,
and Brazil committed about $190 billion, al-
though much of that amount did not need to
be disbursed. Significantly, these financing
packages included commitments not only from
the IMF, but also from individual countries
and other international financial institutions.
In addition, IMF commitments went far be-
yond the normal limits of 100 percent of a
country’s quota, into the range of 500-700 per-
cent for most countries and 1900 percent in
the case of South Korea.62
CED believes that business and political lead-
ers in the United States should work to ensure
adequate funding for the IMF and improve-
ments in its policies and operations.  The IMF
should place more emphasis on crisis preven-
tion through better policies and greater trans-
parency and less on costly stabilization
61. In November 1999 the ESAF was renamed the Poverty Re-
duction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and its objectives were
revised to link poverty reduction with debt forgiveness under the
HIPC initiative.
62. “Safeguarding Prosperity in a Global Financial System: The
Future International Financial Architecture,” Report of an Inde-
pendent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, p.16.
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programs. It should maintain normal lending
limits and a policy of “constructive ambiguity”
with regard to specific cases to diminish con-
cerns about moral hazard. The IMF should
have adequate—though not abundant—re-
sources to promote both crisis prevention and
stabilization.
When stabilization lending beyond the nor-
mal capacity of the IMF is required, individual
nations in crisis, in conjunction with the IMF
acting as a “crisis manager,” will have to assess
what steps will be necessary to secure financial
stability. One implication of this policy is that
in some cases countries will need to pursue
debt rescheduling with their public and pri-
vate creditors or be forced into default.  An-
other is that we will have to rely on the expert
judgment of officials at the IMF, who have
been entrusted with oversight of the interna-
tional financial system, with regard to the spe-
cific steps that should be taken. Our expectation
is that those officials will act in the best inter-
ests of both the country in crisis and the inter-
national financial system.63
IMPROVING IMF OPERATIONS
A major objective of efforts to reform the
international financial architecture is to im-
prove the operations of the IMF. Many reforms
are already being adopted, including those to
increase transparency, improve IMF data stan-
dards and surveillance, increase assistance to
strengthen financial systems of member na-
tions, and establish new sources of funding
and new procedures for borrowing. The IMF is
now taking a stronger surveillance role in its
regular reviews of member countries’ practices,
especially in the area of financial sector super-
vision. In addition, it is participating in and
publicly monitoring the work of the various
institutions and forums in which standard set-
ting and other reforms are being carried out. It
is also a leading participant in the initiative to
reduce the burden of debt on the heavily in-
debted poor countries.
Partly in recognition of the new demands
being placed on the IMF and its role in the
global financial system, the IMF Interim Com-
mittee has been given permanent status and its
name changed to the “International Financial
and Monetary Committee.” The IMF is also
responding to the demand for greater trans-
parency in its own operations. It has adopted a
presumption in favor of release of informa-
tion, both with respect to its own deliberations
and the advice it offers to member countries.
In response to other demands, the IMF is de-
veloping formal mechanisms for evaluating it’s
own operations, programs, policies and proce-
dures, including external review of its surveil-
lance and research activities. It is also
strengthening its Special Data Dissemination
Standard and General Data Dissemination Stan-
dard, which provide guidance to countries’ re-
ports on key economic variables.
The IMF is to be commended for reevaluat-
ing its own policies; however, it should go fur-
ther and faster than it has to date in adapting to
the new realities of the international financial
system. We believe that the IMF must continue
to improve its operating procedures by becom-
ing more transparent and accountable with re-
gard to its own decision making and providing
better and more frequent information to the
public. We recognize that the specific policies
we are recommending for public disclosure of
currently privileged information and for com-
bating fraud and corruption will be difficult to
carry out. However, as discussed below, we are
confident that once they are implemented,
these policies will prove their value and opposi-
tion to them will subside.
Requiring the Release of Information
Although the IMF has taken some impor-
tant steps to encourage countries to release
63. The Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory
Commission, presented to Congress in March, 2000 as this project
was being completed, recommended that the IMF’s stabilization
lending be subject to more explicit rules, including the
prequalification of borrowing countries. In our view this would
substantially reduce the flexibility of the IMF and thereby its
effectiveness in dealing with financial crises.
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publicly information developed in the course
of Article IV consultations, we recommend that
the IMF go beyond encouraging the release of
that information and require that Article IV
consultations be released publicly within 60
days after the consultations take place. This
policy change should be phased in over a rea-
sonable period, perhaps one to two years.  De-
veloping countries should understand that the
release of such information is part of the broad
effort they need to make to keep markets in-
formed of their economic conditions. The more
information that is regularly released, the more
comfortable private investors will become with
investing in developing countries and the more
comfortable those countries will be with the
public release of information that may at times
be unfavorable. Although some have argued
that countries will become less candid in dis-
cussions with the IMF about their problems, in
our view objections to public release will most
likely disappear when the benefits, in the form
of greater access to lower priced capital, take
effect. Much like the standard setting efforts
described in Chapter III, countries that sup-
port the regular release of Article IV informa-
tion should find that markets will help them to
improve their policies and performance and
ultimately reward them with lower-cost capital.
Combating Fraud and Corruption
The IMF should take greater responsibility
for identifying, monitoring, and investigating
how IMF funds are spent and for ensuring that
such funds are not siphoned off in fraud and
corruption. It must take more seriously its re-
sponsibility to ensure that funds borrowed by
member countries go to their intended pur-
poses rather than to Swiss bank accounts.  Re-
cent news accounts, especially with regard to
loans to Russia, raise troubling questions about
the IMF’s policies and procedures, which seem
to tolerate corruption and misuse of funds.
Fund officials should understand that public
support in the United States and other devel-
oped countries will not be sustained unless
clear and visible public efforts are made to stop
corruption and to show that funds are being
used for intended purposes. The IMF should
view its role in this regard in much the same
manner as it views its role with regard to policy
conditionality. The IMF should step up pres-
sure on countries that condone fraud and cor-
ruption and, when it is aware of such abuses,
should expose them. It should also enhance its
ability to monitor loans and other expendi-
tures. Because money is fungible, that may re-
quire greater monitoring of central bank
activities and government finances.
Where the occurrence of fraud and corrup-
tion in a nation that is receiving financial sup-
port from the IMF impedes the sound
functioning of political, legal, and judicial sys-
tems, we recommend that the IMF cease its
support. Doing so will conserve the IMF’s re-
sources and earn it continuing credibility for
its present and future recommendations and
requirements.
CRISIS PREVENTION
The attention given to the role of the IMF
during financial crises should not obscure its
role as both lender and advisor to countries
that are experiencing economic difficulties,
even if not in crisis. The prevention of crises is
one of the IMF’s most important and under-
appreciated tasks. The IMF will continue to
play a vital role as an advisor and source of
funding to support macro-economic adjust-
ments, especially for smaller low-income econo-
mies. Most IMF loans are made in non-crisis
situations. In its lending and advice, the IMF
should emphasize sound macroeconomic poli-
cies and improvement of banking and finan-
cial systems. Through both normal consultation
and lending, the IMF in conjunction with the
World Bank, which promotes long-term struc-
tural change, can play an important role in
inducing countries to adopt policies that will
improve their ability to absorb setbacks, adjust
to short-term perturbations, and assist their
long-term development. Those policies increas-
ingly should be designed to attract private-sec-
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tor financing in the form of foreign direct
investment, bonds, shorter-term trade credits,
and even contingent credit for stabilization
lending. In addition, safety-net policies should
be part of a country’s short- and long-run strat-
egies, as discussed in Chapter 3.
Some observers have called for the creation
of a powerful new organization, either an en-
hanced IMF or a new agency, that could insure
investors against default or otherwise regulate
credit markets.64 Such regulation — insurance
implies regulation — would have the effect of
allocating capital to “good performers” and
would substitute bureaucratic judgment for the
judgment of the market. We believe that such
an entity is unnecessary and, indeed, would
have negative consequences over the long run
by creating greater dependency of borrowers
on such an authority. Developing countries
need to take more, not less, responsibility for
their policies. Moreover, at a practical level it
would be impossible for an international bu-
reaucracy to have the authority it would need
to make such a system work. Private market
incentives can operate effectively without re-
course to such regulatory schemes.
CRISIS RESOLUTION
 The history of financial crises demonstrates
the need for a monetary institution that can
backstop the market by adding liquidity to the
system when necessary to forestall or halt a
panicked conversion of illiquid assets into
money.65 However, such a lender can create
moral hazard if it always steps in to ensure that
creditors are paid. These conflicting demands
have led to considerable policy debate and
difference of opinion on the ultimate desir-
ability of such an institution at the interna-
tional level. In our view, the international
financial system needs to have a financial back-
stop, but there should be some uncertainty
among market participants about whether that
backstop will in fact lend during any particular
crisis.66
At the national level, the role of lender of
last resort is generally filled by the domestic
central bank, although historically it has also
been played by foreign central banks and by
private-sector lenders. At the international level,
even though the IMF lacks the capacity to act
as a true lender of last resort, it has played an
important role in lending to help establish
financial stability.67 Stanley Fischer, First Deputy
Managing Director of the IMF, notes that, al-
though the IMF is not a true lender of last
resort because it cannot create money, in many,
if not most, situations it will either have suffi-
cient funds to lend or be able to assemble a
consortium of lenders with sufficient funds.68
Fischer also argues that the IMF can play a role
associated with the lender of last resort, which
is that of crisis manager—“the institution that
takes upon itself the responsibility for dealing
with a crisis or potential crisis, whether or not
it itself lends for that purpose.”69
These IMF actions — lending and coordi-
nating international assistance to countries in
financial crisis — are essential for both stabiliz-
ing such economies and avoiding the spread of
financial panic to other countries. Once a psy-
chology of panic sets in, as it clearly did in the
64. See George Soros, The Crisis of Global Capitalism, (New York:
Public Affairs Press, 1998); and Henry Kaufman, “Preventing the
Next Global Financial Crisis,” The Washington Post, January 28,
1998, p. A17. Soros’ proposal is for a public corporation to
insure investors against debt defaults; Kaufman’s proposal would
create an international regulator for international financial
markets and institutions. Similar proposals have been made by
others.
65. In particular, see Charles P. Kindleberger, “Manias, Panics,
and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises,” (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1996).
66. ibid
67. The IMF cannot fully play the role of lender of last resort for
a number of reasons: it cannot create money as a central bank
can, the amount of resources available for loan to any one
country is limited; funds are disbursed in tranches (or portions)
over time; and its decision-making processes are too slow.
68. Stanley Fischer, “On the Need for an International Lender of
Last Resort,” paper prepared for delivery to the American Eco-
nomics Association and the American Finance Association. New
York, January 3, 1999. Available at http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/speeches/1999/010399.htm
69. ibid.
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Asian crisis, markets become unstable. Market
instability raises risk and makes people highly
uncertain about the future and very reluctant
to take economic actions. Confidence needs to
be restored before the crisis moves out of con-
trol and spreads to other countries. When a
government cannot quell the panic by itself,
restoring confidence should be the IMF’s para-
mount mission. The IMF should not be reluc-
tant to lend when necessary to halt a financial
panic, but it should maintain the flexibility to
decide on a case-by-case basis.  The require-
ment that the IMF distinguish between cases
that merit lending and those that do not is
essential to a policy of “constructive ambigu-
ity.” Establishing some doubt for lenders that
the IMF will rescue them will reduce moral
hazard and improve the functioning of mar-
kets.
We are concerned that preoccupation with
the possibility that IMF lending may result in
protection for certain creditors may make it
reluctant to act. In general this dilemma should
be resolved strongly in favor of stopping an
immediate crisis. The private sector generally
will suffer economic losses as firms that make
overly risky loans and investments are forced to
write-down their value, and equity markets dis-
count the value of those firms. Similarly, banks
that are forced to extend the maturity of short-
term loans do not escape additional costs.
Private-sector lenders and investors should,
and do, bear the risks of their decisions. Risk
and uncertainty are already major factors in
the calculations of international lenders and
investors. Because the IMF has limited com-
mand over funds that can be committed and
occasional defaults will occur (as in Russia and
more recently in Ecuador) those factors are far
from diminished. Given recent experiences and
the current climate of opinion, private-sector
lenders should foster the understanding that
businesses cannot and should not rely on local
government or IMF bailouts to insure against
losses on investments or loans. Prudent busi-
ness investors recognize the limits of interna-
tional rescue packages relative to the size of
potential financial claims. They should also
note the current bias of international officials
toward the imposition of additional private sec-
tor burden-sharing in the wake of recent expe-
rience in emerging market crises.
While we understand that some private-sec-
tor lenders and investors will and should take
losses in financial crises, we believe that the
IMF should act as a neutral “crisis manager”
when the need arises—neither bailing in nor
bailing out foreign lenders. Its function should
be to help a country to stabilize its economy
and achieve a sustainable level of foreign cur-
rency obligations. In some cases that may re-
sult in financial losses for foreign private-sector
investors and lenders, but such losses should
be a consequence of fundamental policy deci-
sions and negotiated debt restructuring, not
the deliberate objective of IMF stabilization
programs.
The IMF should not view the determination
of how countries will resolve their debts to
foreign creditors as part of its mission. The
decision on how to resolve potential defaults
should be made by a nation and its creditors.
By imposing its own view of appropriate bur-
den sharing, the IMF would be unnecessarily
inserting itself into decisions that should be
determined by market participants. In general,
so-called “private-sector bail-ins” would not serve
the interests of developing nations. Imposing
costs on private investors, beyond those they
already bear, would lower the supply and in-
crease the cost of capital for those countries.
Rather than mandate how costs will be distrib-
uted, IMF policy should support a country’s
right to determine for itself whether it wants to
accept those longer-term costs in exchange for
short-term relief from private debt payments.
Although IMF managers will find it difficult to
maintain the appropriate balance among com-
peting policy goals, they should focus on the
restoration of confidence and the sustainability
of economic growth within a client country,
not the size or form of financial losses incurred
by foreign private-sector investors and lenders.
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CONCLUSION
Most of the problems that have afflicted
emerging market countries have been home
grown, including moral hazards in the form of
unrealistic guarantees extended through
pegged exchange rates and government-guided
financial systems. Developing countries need
to bring their economic practices and domes-
tic institutions up to world-class standards and
rely more on the power of markets to facilitate
economic growth and development. To assist
this process, they should improve the transpar-
ency, quality, and frequency of the public- and
private-sector information provided to those
markets.
Our emphasis in this report has been on
the benefits of market-driven improvements to
the international financial system. Our recom-
mendations are founded on the belief that
markets will reward countries with institutions
and policies that engender confidence, attract
private capital, and allocate capital efficiently.
With regard to the controversial issue of so-
called private-sector bail-ins, we support pri-
vate-sector arrangements based on market-
determined outcomes rather than government-
mandated solutions. We believe negotiations
between lenders and borrowers should deter-
mine the substance of bond contracts, and we
support market-based negotiations between
debtors and creditors when necessary to re-
solve potential defaults.
 We recognize both the need for develop-
ing country governments to help themselves
and the indispensable role of the IMF in pre-
venting financial crises where possible and sta-
bilizing afflicted economies if prevention fails.
We have confidence in the expertise and dis-
cretion of IMF officials to manage crises, and
we do not wish to see them hamstrung by too
many rules. We want the IMF to be adequately,
although not abundantly, funded.
The international financial system is funda-
mentally sound, although more susceptible to
financial crisis than it need be. We urge busi-
ness leaders and officials in governments and
the IMF to carry out the comprehensive set of
incremental reforms recommended in this re-
port. These reforms must be viewed as a pack-
age; many individual recommendations will be
most effective only if others are implemented.
We firmly believe that adoption of this package
of recommendations would significantly en-
hance the stability of the international finan-
cial system and reduce its susceptibility to crisis.
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OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
For more than 50 years, the Committee for
Economic Development has been a respected
influence on the formation of business and
public policy. CED is devoted to these two
objectives:
To develop, through objective research and
informed discussion, findings and recommenda-
tions for private and public policy that will contrib-
ute to preserving and strengthening our free society,
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improving the quality of life for all.
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and education, and among concerned citizens, of the
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they can be achieved.
CED’s work is supported by private volun-
tary contributions from business and industry,
foundations, and individuals. It is independent,
nonprofit, nonpartisan, and nonpolitical.
Through this business-academic partner-
ship, CED endeavors to develop policy state-
ments and other research materials that
commend themselves as guides to public and
business policy; that can be used as texts in
college economics and political science courses
and in management training courses; that
will be considered and discussed by newspaper
and magazine editors, columnists, and com-
mentators; and that are distributed abroad to
promote better understanding of the Ameri-
can economic system.
CED believes that by enabling business
leaders to demonstrate constructively their con-
cern for the general welfare, it is helping busi-
ness to earn and maintain the national and
community respect essential to the successful
functioning of the free enterprise capitalist
system.
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Madrid, Spain
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CED COUNTERPART ORGANIZATIONS
Close relations exist between the Committee for Economic Development and
independent, nonpolitical research organizations in other countries. Such counter-
part groups are composed of business executives and scholars and have objec-
tives similar to those of CED, which they pursue by similarly objective methods.
CED cooperates with these organizations on research and study projects of
common interest to the various countries concerned. This program has resulted
in a number of joint policy statements involving such international matters as
energy, East-West trade, assistance to developing countries, and the reduction
of nontariff barriers to trade.
